Essays on new product development alliances by Kalaignanam, Kartik
  
 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCES 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
 
by 
 
KARTIK KALAIGNANAM 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
August 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Marketing 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCES 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
 
by 
 
KARTIK KALAIGNANAM 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of  
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Co-Chairs of Committee, Rajan Varadarajan 
    Venkatesh Shankar 
Committee Members,  David Szymanski 
    Michael Hitt 
Head of Department,  Jeffrey Conant 
 
 
 
August 2007 
 
 
Major Subject: Marketing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on New Product Development Alliances. 
 
(August 2007) 
 
Kartik Kalaignanam, B.EN., University of Mumbai; 
 
M.A.S., K.J. Somaiya Institute of Management Studies and Research; 
 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Rajan Varadarajan 
      Dr. Venkatesh Shankar 
 
 
Interorganizational alliances are widely recognized as critical to product innovation. A 
notable trend is the rapid growth of new product development (NPD) alliances between 
large, well-established firms and small, growing firms. This dissertation is comprised of 
two studies on the formation and termination of asymmetric new product development 
alliances. In study one I examine the factors that drive the changes in shareholder values 
of the partner firms. I develop and empirically test a model of short-term changes in 
shareholder values of larger and smaller firms involved in NPD alliances, using the 
event study methodology on data covering 167 asymmetric alliances in the information 
technology and communication industries. The model accounts for selection correction, 
potential cross-correlation across the residuals from the models of firm value changes for 
the larger and smaller firms, and unobserved heterogeneity. The results suggest that both 
the partners experience significant short-term financial gains, but there are considerable 
asymmetries between the larger and smaller firms with regard to the effects of alliance, 
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partner and firm characteristics on the gains of the partner firms. The findings of this 
study have important implications for managers of both large and small firms. 
In study two I develop and test a framework of the determinants of new product 
alliance (NPA) terminations. The hypotheses for study two are tested on a unique 
database comprised of 401 new product alliances involving 24 pharmaceutical firms 
during 1990-2005.  NPA terminations are modeled using Cox’s proportional hazard 
specification that accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity of firms with multiple 
NPAs, competing risks and ties among NPA duration times. The results suggest that 
NPA terminations are not made in isolation but are influenced by composition of the 
firm’s portfolio. The results also suggest that NPA terminations are predicted to a great 
extent by competition between alliances (i.e., product market rivalry) and competition 
within alliances (i.e., partner value). The findings of this study have important 
implications for managing a portfolio of new product partnerships.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
Interorganizational alliances are widely recognized as critical to product innovation. A 
notable trend is the rapid growth of new product development (NPD) alliances between 
large, well-established firms and small, growing firms. These alliances involving 
disparately sized firms are referred to as asymmetric alliances.  In particular, in high 
technology markets, during 1970-1990, approximately 2300 asymmetric alliances were 
formed (Barley, Freeman, and Hybels 1991; Kogut and Kim 1991). Furthermore, the 
number of asymmetric alliances in high technology industries increased by over 250% 
during the 1990s (Cyr 2001). 
In high-technology settings, larger, established firms seek R&D partnerships with 
smaller, growing firms because the latter are endowed with intangible resources and 
unique technological capabilities in niche areas (Chen and Hambrick 1995; Stuart 2000). 
Gomes-Casseres (1997) notes that although larger firms have been traditionally 
dominant players in the information technology and pharmaceutical industries, the 
advent of new technologies such as microelectronics and biotechnology presents unique 
opportunities for smaller entrepreneurial firms to pursue targeted innovation. Research 
on entrepreneurship (e.g., Eckhardt, Shane, and Delmar 2006) suggests that ties with 
larger firms are vital to the growth of smaller firms for at least two reasons.1
                                                          
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Marketing Research. 
1 In this dissertation, the terms larger firms and smaller firms refer to differences in firm size.  
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First, smaller firms, being strapped for funds, use the alliances with larger firms to 
infuse the needed tangible resources for commercializing their new product development 
efforts. Second, partnerships with prominent partners such as larger, established firms 
buffers smaller firms from their liability of smallness, enhances their chances of 
survival, and boosts sales growth (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; Stuart 2000). 
For instance, the stock price of Net2phone, a small Internet service provider, increased 
by 50%, following the announcement of a strategic NPD alliance with larger firms, 
Compaq and Sprint (Business Week 1999).  
Typically, incumbent firms in high technology industries (e.g., pharmaceuticals, 
semiconductors, information technology) pursue multiple new product alliances with 
entrepreneurial firms to bolster their product pipelines. Managing multiple new product 
partnerships is a complex endeavor requiring incumbents to make numerous decisions 
periodically. One such decision pertains to pulling the plug on ‘less promising’ NPAs 
and diverting resources to other NPAs in the portfolio (Bordley 2003; Hauser, Tellis, and 
Griffin 2006). Marion Merell Dow, a pharmaceutical firm, entered into a 10-year 
agreement with Alteon in 1990 to develop and market Pimagedine and selected 
compounds. The scope of the 10-year agreement included R&D collaboration, $20M 
funding for Pimagedine's clinical development and provisions for the joint promotion 
and sale of the product in the U.S., Canada and Western Europe. However, Marion 
Merrell Dow ended its alliance with Alteon much before the completion of the ten year 
period. According to managers in Alteon, any termination other than an unanticipated 
failure of the product development program was never envisioned by the alliance 
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partners (Van Brunt 1999). NPAs can be terminated for a number of reasons such as 
when partners have accomplished the objectives or when the NPA technology has failed. 
Yet, casual observation suggests that incumbents manage and balancing their portfolio 
by weeding out NPAs that do not fit its strategic objectives (Chan, Nickerson, and Owan 
2007).  
Given the proliferation of asymmetric new product development alliances in high-
technology industries, it is important to understand how these alliances create or destroy 
value for the partnering firms. In addition to alliance formation, it is also important to 
understand the factors that influence the termination of asymmetric new product 
development alliances. The broad objectives of this dissertation are to assess the drivers 
of the financial gains or losses accruing to partnering firms from new product 
development alliances and the determinants of new product development alliance 
terminations.  
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CHAPTER II 
FINANCIAL RETURNS FROM ASYMMETRIC NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCES 
OVERVIEW 
Interorganizational alliances are widely recognized as critical to product innovation, 
particularly in high technology markets. Many new product development (NPD) 
alliances tend to be asymmetric, that is, they are formed between a larger firm and a 
smaller firm. These asymmetric alliances typically result in changes in the shareholder 
values of the partner firms. Are the changes in shareholder values of partner firms 
significant? Is the NPD alliance a win-win or win-lose partnership? Are they symmetric 
for the larger and smaller partner firms? What factors drive the changes in shareholder 
values of the partner firms? These important questions remain unexplored as there is 
little empirical research on the effect of NPD alliance on shareholder value and on the 
apportionment of this value between the partner firms. I develop and empirically test a 
model of short-term changes in shareholder values of larger and smaller firms involved 
in NPD alliances, using the event study methodology on data covering 167 asymmetric 
alliances in the information technology and communication industries. In this model, I 
examine alliance, firm, and partner characteristics as potential determinants of the 
changes in shareholder values of the partner firms due to a NPD alliance announcement. 
The model accounts for selection correction, potential cross-correlation across the 
residuals from the models of firm value changes for the larger and smaller firms, and 
unobserved heterogeneity. The results suggest that both the partners experience 
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significant short-term financial gains, but there are considerable asymmetries between 
the larger and smaller firms with regard to the effects of alliance, partner and firm 
characteristics on the gains of the partner firms. The results relating to alliance 
characteristics suggest that while a broad scope alliance enhances the financial gains for 
the larger firm, a scale R&D alliance (relative to a link alliance) contributes positively to 
the financial gains for the smaller firm. With regard to partner characteristics, while 
partner alliance experience positively influences the financial gains for the larger firm, it 
has no significant effect on the financial returns for the smaller firm. Further, partner 
innovativeness is positively associated with the financial gains for the larger firm, but 
partner reputation is unrelated to the financial gains of the smaller firm. As regard firm 
characteristics, the magnitude of the financial gains accruing from a firm’s own alliance 
experience is considerably higher for the smaller firm than it is for the larger firm.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The outcomes of asymmetric alliances, particularly the changes in shareholder values of 
partner firms, may be different across the firms. It is important to use stock-market 
returns as an outcome measure for studying the impact of NPD alliances because 
shareholder value is a forward-looking metric (e.g., Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and 
Konsynski 1999; Houston and Johnson 2000; Kumar, Ramaswami, and Srivastava 
2000). A small body of literature has examined changes in the shareholder values of 
firms in partnerships involving disparately sized firms, albeit not in the context of new 
product development. For instance, evidence from the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
literature suggests that the acquired firm (the smaller firm) and the acquiring firm (the 
larger firm) experience positive and negative short-term abnormal returns, respectively 
(Asquith 1983). Prior research on inter-firm partnerships in general (not in the NPD 
context) and firm value (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Chan et al 1997; Das, Sen, and 
Sengupta 1998; Koh and Venkatraman 1991; McConnell and Nantell 1985) suggests that 
while strategic alliances do create value for firms, there is lack of consensus on the 
division of financial gains between larger and smaller partners. In many cases, much of 
the economic value created between smaller/entrepreneurial and larger firms is 
appropriated by the larger partner (Alvarez and Barney 2001). Examining a sample of 60 
joint ventures, McConnell and Nantell (1985) observe that the investors in the smaller 
firm, on average, receive larger abnormal returns, but the absolute gains in shareholder 
value for both partners are more or less equivalent. Likewise, Chan et al. (1997) 
conclude that while smaller partners experience larger abnormal returns than larger 
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partners, the magnitudes of the absolute gains are roughly equal. In contrast, in an 
analysis of 60 non-equity alliances from the information technology sector, Koh and 
Venkatraman (1991) point out that on average, the smaller partner gains substantially 
($19.2 million) more than the larger partner ($2.3 million). An analysis of the 
cumulative abnormal returns of 50 firms involved in strategic alliances reveals that the 
gains to the smaller firm exceed those to the larger partner firm (Das, Sen, and Sengupta 
1998). The divergent results in prior studies can be attributed to heterogeneity in the 
focus of alliance agreements (e.g., R&D or NPD, marketing, and licensing). Not much is 
known about how NPD alliance affects the changes in the shareholder values of the 
partner firms and whether they are asymmetric. 
More importantly, despite the recognition that an understanding of the factors 
contributing to the financial gains in such asymmetric alliances is beneficial to scholars 
and managers (Koh and Venkatraman 1991; McConnell and Nantell 1985), not much is 
known about the drivers of the financial gains for the partner firms. In particular, very 
little is known about differences in the drivers of financial returns to larger and smaller 
firms in a NPD alliance.  This dissertation seeks to fill this research gap. 
Are the changes in shareholder values of the partner firms in an asymmetric NPD 
alliance announcement significantly positive or negative? Are the gains in a NPD 
alliance symmetric between the larger and the smaller partner firms? What are the 
determinants of the changes in shareholder values of the partner firms in an NPD 
alliance? The answers to these questions are important for both larger and smaller firms 
to better select their partners, the scope and type of alliance, and the resources to be 
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allocated for new product development. The objective of this paper is to develop and 
empirically test a model of factors influencing the creation/erosion of shareholder values 
of partner firms following the announcement of asymmetric NPD alliances. 
To address these important research questions, I follow a three-step process. First, I 
develop a conceptual framework of the major determinants of the changes in shareholder 
values of partner firms in a NPD alliance.  Second, I use the event study approach to 
determine the short-term changes to shareholder value that accrue to larger and smaller 
firms after a NPD alliance is announced. Third, I estimate a model comprising the 
effects of firm, alliance, and partner characteristics on shareholder value changes for 
larger and smaller firms in a NPD alliance using data from 167 asymmetric NPD 
alliances in the information technology and communication industries.  
This study contributes to the literature on NPD alliances in at least two distinct ways. 
First, to my knowledge, this study is the first to examine factors affecting the financial 
gains of both larger and smaller firms in a NPD alliance. In doing so, I seek to address 
concerns expressed in the literature regarding the limitations of focusing on the 
performance of one of the two firms in a partnership (e.g., Wuyts, Stremersch, and Dutta 
2004). Second, much prior empirical research examining the impact of alliances on firm 
performance has focused exclusively on either alliance characteristics (Bucklin and 
Sengupta 1993; Chan et al 1997; Wuyts, Stremersch, and Dutta 2004), or firm 
characteristics (Anand and Khanna 2000; Chan et al 1997; Johnson, Sohi, and Grewal 
2004), or partner characteristics (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; Stuart 2000). I 
extend the literature by rigorously developing and empirically testing a model that links 
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all three types of factors (i.e., firm, alliance, and partner characteristics) to changes in the 
partner firms’ shareholder values in a single framework focused on NPD alliances.  The 
model accounts for selection correction, potential cross-correlation across the residuals 
from the models of firm value changes for the larger and smaller firms, and unobserved 
heterogeneity.    
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Figure 1 presents a conceptual model delineating the factors influencing the creation or 
erosion of partner firms’ values in asymmetric NPD alliances. An exogenous event such 
as the formation of an alliance is likely to change a firm’s asset price through a change in 
the anticipated cash flows as well as change in the discount rate associated with the 
firm’s future cash flows (Schwert 1981). I expect firm characteristics (alliance 
experience), alliance characteristics (alliance scope and alliance type) and partner 
characteristics (partner alliance experience, partner reputation, and partner 
innovativeness) to be the major determinants of changes to the net present value of each 
partner firm in a NPD alliance.  I develop hypotheses about the effects of the potential 
drivers of shareholder value creation in a NPD alliance.  Although not all hypotheses 
focus on asymmetries between the larger and smaller firms, the intent is to examine the 
differences between the partner firms in the results of the tests of the hypotheses.  
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FIGURE 1  
FIRM VALUE CREATION/EROSION IN ASYMMETRIC NEW PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCES: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Characteristics  
• Firm alliance experience   
• Firm size (Control) 
• Firm age (Control) 
• Firm fixed effect (Control) 
Alliance Characteristics 
• Alliance scope 
• Broad versus Narrow  
• Alliance type 
• Scale versus Link  
Firm Value  
 
(a) Financial gains/losses of 
the larger firm 
 
(b) Financial gains/losses of 
the smaller firm 
 
 
Alliance Characteristics 
• Alliance scope 
• Broad versus Narrow  
• Alliance type 
• Scale versus Link  
Other Control Variables 
• Year of alliance 
formation 
• Industry fixed effect 
• Selection correction 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm alliance experience. A firm’s alliance experience exposes it to rich combinations of 
processes, inputs and outcomes and enables it to better adapt to contingencies as well as 
acquire new related knowledge. Previous alliance experience may enhance the stock 
market performance of the firm involved in a NPD alliance in at least two ways (Anand 
and Khanna 2000; Sampson 2005). First, firms with alliance experience learn to better 
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manage complex new alliances through the establishment of a general alliance 
management capability and inter-organizational routines that aid in partner selection and 
conflict management (Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath 2002; Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002). 
Second, firms accumulate valuable technological and product-market knowledge from 
past alliances that enable them to be more successful in a new NPD alliance.  
Although alliance experience is likely to have a positive impact on the financial 
gains accruing to both larger and smaller firms, I expect the gains to accrue to these 
partner firms through different mechanisms. Because more public information is 
typically available for larger firms than for smaller firms, investors know more about the 
strategies of larger, well-established firms than about smaller firms. Therefore, while 
past alliances by a larger firm may not provide radically new information to investors, 
they provide information about the larger firm’s experience in accessing intangible 
resources and reduce investor uncertainty about the new alliance through a decrease in 
the larger firm’s risk profile (i.e., discount rate), resulting in a higher firm value. For a 
smaller firm, its past alliances with other firms provide information about its 
accessibility to tangible resources and social capital, which yields additional cash flows 
as well lowers its risk profile (see Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; Stuart 2000 for 
reviews). Ability to work with partners is a specific competence that plays an important 
role in an entrepreneur’s success (Baron 2000) and thus the smaller firm’s value. I 
summarize the arguments through the following hypothesis. 
H1: The greater the alliance experience of a firm in a NPD alliance, the 
greater the financial gains to that firm. 
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Alliance Characteristics 
Alliance scope (Broad vs. Narrow).The scope of the NPD alliance may influence the 
change in firm value. Alliance scope refers to the breadth of functional activities (e.g., 
R&D, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution) that the partners agree to undertake 
during the tenure of the alliance (Doz and Hamel 1998; Varadarajan and Cunningham 
1995).  Alliance scope can be construed as a proxy for the pre-commercial value of the 
alliance, which the investor community uses to estimate the future revenue streams of 
the firms. Broad scope alliances are likely to generate more revenues and financial gains 
than narrow scope alliances for at least two major reasons.  First, an alliance that 
encompasses many functional areas of collaboration signals a greater financial potential 
than one that covers only a few areas.  Second, a broad scope alliance also indicates 
greater commitment by the partners toward the alliance than does a narrow scope 
alliance. 
Despite this wisdom regarding the benefits of broad scope NPD alliances, narrow 
scope NPD alliances are quite common in high technology industries. Firms in the 
information and communication equipment (ICE) industries routinely limit the scope of 
NPD alliances to prevent the loss of technological knowledge to partners competing in 
overlapping product-markets (Oxley and Sampson 2004). Likewise, theory and evidence 
from the biopharmaceutical industry suggests that because the threat of knowledge 
spillovers and technology appropriation are higher in broad and complex alliances than 
they are in narrow scope alliances, the larger firm (i.e., pharmaceutical partner) is likely 
to corner a greater proportion of the revenues than the smaller firm (i.e., biotechnology 
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partner) (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Lerner and Merges 1998; Veugelers and Kesteloot 
1996). Therefore, I expect the larger firm to benefit more from broad scope NPD 
alliances than from narrow scope NPD alliances because a broad scope alliance provides 
the large firm with greater opportunity for private gains, whereas a narrow scope alliance 
restricts the magnitude of such gains. For the smaller firm, however, any benefit from a 
broad scope alliance may be offset by the need to have a narrow and restrictive scope to 
protect misappropriation of R&D assets and leakage of knowledge (Li, Eden, Hitt, and 
Ireland 2005). Therefore, instead of offering a formal hypothesis on this relationship for 
the smaller firm, I treat it as an empirical issue for subsequent investigation.  
H2: The broader the scope of a NPD alliance, the greater the financial gains to the 
larger firm. 
 
Alliance type (Scale vs. Link).Partnerships between firms in a NPD alliance involve the 
pooling or exchange of firm-specific resources, leading to two types of NPD alliances, 
scale alliance and link alliance (Hennart 1998). Scale alliances refer to partnership deals 
in which resources are pooled for activities in the same stage(s) of the value chain, 
which in the case of an NPD alliance, is the R&D stage. Link alliances refer to 
partnership deals in which resources are exchanged for activities performed at different 
stages of the value chain. From the standpoint of exchange of resources, R&D and 
marketing are two stages that are important in the innovation process (Song and Thieme 
2006). 
Asymmetric alliances are somewhat unstable because they exacerbate learning 
asymmetries, resulting in the larger firm often ‘finishing’ learning before the smaller 
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firm (Doz and Hamel 1998). The extent to which firms have the opportunity to engage in 
learning races, however, varies by the type of alliance. Dussuage, Garrette, and Mitchell 
(2000) note that deals in which resources are exchanged (link) tend to produce more 
asymmetric outcomes than deals in which resources are pooled (scale). In general, in 
link alliances involving NPD, the smaller firm contributes resources to upstream 
activities (e.g., R&D) and the larger firm contributes resources to downstream activities 
(e.g., manufacturing, marketing, distribution). Failure to gain expertise in downstream 
activities could be detrimental to the long-term survival of the smaller firm as it 
diminishes its chances of independently commercializing its innovations in the future. 
The reasoning is similar to that advanced by Hitt et al. (2000) for the greater preference 
of complementary capabilities in alliances by developed market firms (typically larger 
firms) over emerging market firms (typically smaller firms). As a result, I expect the 
balance of power to shift toward the larger partner in link alliances. 
In contrast, a scale alliance shifts the balance toward the middle because both the 
partners agree to pool resources for R&D and possibly, manufacturing and marketing, 
thereby providing the smaller firm with greater access to resources and technical know-
how. This argument is consistent with empirical evidence from the biopharmaceutical 
sector, which suggests that more control rights (e.g., patents) from technology alliances 
are assigned to the smaller firm (i.e., the R&D-intensive firm) than they are to the larger 
firm (i.e., the client firm) when the smaller firm is in a better bargaining position (as 
reflected by its strong equity market value) (Lerner and Merges 1998). Therefore, I 
expect the smaller firm to benefit more when it contributes greater resources to the 
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different stages of NPD and stakes a greater claim to the residual rights from product 
innovation. In addition, from the smaller partner’s viewpoint, the possibility of the larger 
partner prematurely exiting the alliance is lower in scale alliances because of the greater 
involvement of the larger partner in upstream NPD activities (i.e., R&D). These 
arguments suggest that smaller firms are likely to benefit more from scale alliances, 
whereas larger firms are likely to gain more from link alliances. 
H3a: The financial gains to the larger firm in a NPD alliance will be greater for 
link alliances than they are for scale alliances. 
 
H3b: The financial gains to the smaller firm in a NPD alliance will be greater 
for scale alliances than they are for link alliances. 
  
 
Partner Characteristics 
Partner alliance experience. In addition to own alliance experience, the alliance 
experience of its partner firm can play an important role in determining changes in the 
shareholder value of a firm. Consider first the changes in the value of the larger firm. In 
choosing its smaller partner firm, the larger firm is typically faced with an adverse 
selection problem because of information asymmetries with respect to the quality of 
smaller firms (Shane, Shankar, and Aravindakshan 2006). The alliance experience of a 
smaller partner is likely to benefit the larger partner. Although, the larger firm may not 
have had any previous alliance with the smaller firm, the social networks of the larger 
firms with prominent firms with whom the smaller firm has ties or prior experience, 
could provide valuable insights about the quality of the smaller partner. In addition, I 
expect the effect to be positive in the NPD context because the stock market is more 
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likely to respond favorably when the larger firm partners with the smaller firm 
possessing greater NPD alliance experience. The partner alliance experience serves to 
reduce the uncertainty regarding the NPD effort. As a result, I advance the following 
hypothesis.  
H4a: The greater the smaller firm’s alliance experience, the greater the 
financial gains to the larger firm in a NPD alliance. 
  
 
The partner’s alliance experience will likely have a positive effect on the financial 
gains to the smaller firm as well.  Alliance outcomes for a focal firm are positively 
impacted by learning through their direct experience as well as by the experience of their 
alliance partners (Sarkar, Echambadi, and Ford 2003). Thus, the smaller firms could 
benefit from the experience of larger partners as it provides them the opportunity to 
mimic their alliance management techniques (e.g., process routines to initiate, manage, 
and terminate alliances [Johnson, Sohi, and Grewal 2004]). Therefore, I expect the effect 
to be positive because the stock market is likely to be better informed about the 
strategies of larger firms with higher R&D alliance experience than about larger firms 
with little experience in managing complex NPD alliances. As a result, I advance the 
following hypothesis: 
H4b: The greater the larger firm’s alliance experience, the greater the financial 
gains to the smaller firm in a NPD alliance.  
 
 
Partner reputation. Reputation refers to a global perception of the extent to which an 
organization is held in high esteem or regard by its key constituents on the basis of its 
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past actions and future appeal (Fombrun and Shanley 1990). Firms contemplating 
alliances assess potential partners on reputation (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; 
Shane, Shankar, and Aravindakshan 2006; Stuart 2000).  In general, the quality (e.g., of 
products and management) of smaller firms is uncertain because few indicators of their 
key constituents (e.g., customers, suppliers, collaborators, and investors) are available to 
assess their track record.  Partnering with reputed larger firms provides several benefits 
to smaller firms. First, an alliance with a larger firm generally draws the attention of the 
key constituents to the new venture and the smaller firm (Stuart 2000). Second, the fact 
that a reputed larger firm has selected a smaller and lesser-known entity over alternative 
firms provides a valuable endorsement for the smaller firm (Stuart 2000). Third, alliance 
with a reputed firm provides access to valuable skills and resources (e.g., product-market 
capital and social capital) that the smaller firm lacks. Because larger firms do not 
typically enter into asymmetric alliances with smaller firms to derive reputation benefits, 
there is no hypothesis offered for the effect of partner reputation on changes in 
shareholder values for larger firms. Based on these arguments, I expect the performance 
of smaller firms to be enhanced in their alliances with reputable larger firms, leading to 
H5. 
H5: In a NPD alliance, the financial gains to the smaller firm are greater when 
its larger partner firm has a higher reputation.  
 
 
Partner innovativeness. While smaller firms can benefit from the reputation of larger 
partner firms, larger firms could dilute their reputation by partnering with smaller, low-
quality firms. Small, young firms, by definition, have little or negligible reputation due 
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to their relatively short track record. Yet, they are attractive alliance NPD partners to 
larger firms because of their expertise in niche areas of technology, especially in 
industries where the locus of innovation lies more outside than inside the firm.  Prior 
studies suggest that while larger firms are bestowed with innovation advantages in 
mature industries, smaller firms tend to innovate more in growing industries 
characterized by the absence of a standardized product. Acs and Audretsch (1988) note 
that while larger firms tend to be more innovative in industries with imperfect 
competition, smaller firms are more innovative in industries with perfect competition. 
Smaller firms with their innovative capabilities in niche areas enable larger firms to 
overcome their structural inertia and technological rigidity. A larger firm can learn from 
a smaller firm and enhance its performance in a NPD context (Rothaermel 2001). Based 
on the preceding arguments, I expect the performance of larger firms in high technology 
industries to be higher when partnering for NPD with innovative smaller firms than with 
non-innovative smaller firms. Because smaller firms do not typically enter into 
asymmetric alliances with larger firms to gain from the larger firm’s innovativeness, I do 
not expect an effect of partner innovativeness on the financial gains for smaller firms. I 
expect the smaller firm to gain mainly through the transfer of social capital (e.g., 
reputation) than through their larger partner’s innovativeness. 
H6: In a NPD alliance, the financial gains to the larger firm will be greater 
when the smaller partner firm is more innovative. 
 
 
In addition to these focal variables, I also expect control variables such as firm size, firm 
age, year of alliance announcement, industry-specific and firm-specific characteristics to 
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impact the changes in the value of the partner firms in a NPD alliance. The 
operationalization of these variables and their effects on changes in firm values are 
discussed subsequently. 
 
DATA 
I test the hypotheses in an empirical setting comprising two broad industries that exhibit 
several asymmetric alliances, namely, the information technology and 
telecommunication industries. Data on NPD alliances between firms in these industries 
were drawn from the joint ventures/alliances database of the Securities Data Company 
(SDC). Specifically, the sample comprised firms in the computer and office equipment 
(i.e., SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, and 3579), prepackaged software (i.e., 
SIC code 7372), and communications equipment (i.e., SIC codes 3661, 3663, and 3669) 
industries that entered into R&D alliances between January 1993 and September 2004.  
The selection of this time period was influenced by the observation that SDC did not 
track all deals by U.S. firms during the period 1990-1992 because of inadequate 
corporate reporting requirements (Anand and Khanna 2000). Therefore, the starting date 
for data collection was January 1993. The second sampling requirement was to identify 
alliances in which both firms were publicly traded U.S. firms.2 The third sampling 
requirement was to only include non-equity alliances. This was necessary because equity 
alliances could potentially be an intermediate step for the larger firm to acquire the 
                                                          
2 It is worth noting that resource scarcity and information asymmetry problems in publicly held small 
firms may not be as severe as they are in privately held small firms. However, even small publicly held 
firms are faced with problems of survival.  In addition, given that it is almost impossible to objectively 
assess the performance of privately held firms, focusing on small public firms is the only practical 
approach to empirically test our hypotheses.  
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smaller firm, and therefore the stock market could potentially be responding to the 
smaller firm’s potential as an acquisition target.  
The fourth sampling requirement was to identify alliances with considerable size 
asymmetries. The lack of prior research in this area made it necessary to empirically 
define the cut-off point for size differences. Prior research has operationalized firm size 
as assets or sales or number of employees. In this study, I operationalize firm size in 
terms of the assets of the firm in millions of dollars.3  To better examine asymmetry in 
NPD alliances, I consider only those alliances in which the ratio of the larger firm’s 
assets to that of the smaller firm is greater than five. Table 1 provides the frequency 
distribution of asymmetric R&D alliances involving publicly traded firms between 1993 
and 2004. There were no asymmetric alliances recorded during 1996. The size ratio 
exceeded 10 in approximately 85% of the alliances, reflecting considerable size 
asymmetries in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Subsequent alternate operationalizations of firm size in terms of sales and number of employees yielded 
substantively identical results with regard to size asymmetries in alliances.  
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TABLE 1  
 DISTRIBUTION OF NPD ALLIANCES BY SIZE ASYMMETRY  
 
Size Ratio Number Percentage 
5.0-6.0 9 5.39 
6.1-8.0 7 4.19 
8.1-10.0 10 5.99 
10.1 and above 141 84.43 
Total 167 100.00 
 
 
 
The sample attrition criteria yielded 222 dyadic relationships between a larger firm 
and a smaller firm. I checked the accuracy of the NPD alliance announcement date, the 
most critical aspect of the event study methodology using Lexis-Nexis.4 I eliminated 19 
observations because of uncertainty about the announcement date. In the remaining 
cases, the SDC announcement date did not differ from the announcement dates provided 
by Lexis-Nexis. Additional checks for concurrent events (e.g., announcement of 
quarterly results, announcement of new product introductions, and changes in executive 
positions) around the 3-day window surrounding the announcement resulted in the 
elimination of 36 announcements that could potentially confound the results.  The 
accuracy and confounding event check procedures yielded a final sample of 167 dyads. 
                                                          
4 Although the SDC database on alliances is by far, the most comprehensive source of information on 
alliance agreements, the dates are occasionally misreported in the database (Anand and Khanna 2000). In 
some cases, the database reports the date on which negotiations for the alliance began, whereas in other 
cases, it reports the date on which the alliance was signed.  In addition, observations on a single agreement 
mistakenly appear more than once. 
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This sample size compares well with those in studies that have used the event study 
methodology (Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2003), offering sufficient statistical power to 
test the hypotheses. I collected the measures of firm size and market capitalization from 
the Compustat database. 
A sample of description of the NPD alliances in the data appears in Table 2.  The 
larger firms ranged from Microsoft to Lucent Technologies. The smaller firms included 
Shiva Corp., Documentum, Inc. and Xylan Corp. Some of the NPD alliances explicitly 
included marketing agreements as well. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2   
SAMPLE OF ASYMMETRIC NPD ALLIANCES  
 
Larger Firm Smaller Firm New Product Alliance Details 
Microsoft Corp. Wang Laboratories Development and marketing of 
Windows NT versions of 
imaging and workflow server 
products 
Oracle Corp. i2 Technologies Joint development of a supply 
chain optimization solution  
International Business 
Machines (IBM) 
Xylan Corp. Development, manufacturing and 
marketing of network switches  
Motorola Corp. Shiva Corp. Development of an enhanced 
version of Motorola 925 system 
for the remote access market. 
Hewlett-Packard Skytel Corp. Development and marketing of 
wireless marketing solutions for 
palm-top computers 
Digital Equipment Corp. Spire Technologies Joint development and marketing 
of an application programming 
interface software 
Lucent Technologies Novatel Wireless Development of next generation 
multi-mode, multi-band wireless 
data products 
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MEASURES AND METHODOLOGY 
Table 3 provides a summary of the variables and their operationalization.  
 
 
TABLE 3   
VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND DATA SOURCES: STUDY ONE 
 
Variable Operational Measure Data Source(s) 
Net present value Cumulative short-term abnormal returns x Market 
capitalization 20 days prior to the announcement 
Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) 
Alliance experience Number of alliances entered by the firm from 1993 
including the current alliance 
Securities Data Company 
(SDC), Lexis Nexis 
Alliance scope Number of functional areas in which the partners 
agree to cooperate 
SDC, Lexis Nexis 
Alliance type 
• Scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Link 
 
If the alliance agreement states that the activities 
are undertaken jointly by the partners 
Example: “Sun Microsystems Computer Corp, a 
unit of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and Ancor 
Communications, Inc. have agreed to jointly 
develop and market the industry’s first switched 
fiber channel attachment to a disk storage array.”  
If the alliance agreement states that the activities 
are exchanged between the partners 
Example: Lucent Technologies and Novatel 
Wireless have entered into a strategic alliance to 
develop the next-generation high tech wireless 
products that will allow users to access mobile 
users to access the Internet and corporate networks 
over the 3G universal mobile telecommunications 
system network. According to the terms of the 
agreement, Novatel was to develop multi-mode 
multi-band UMTS/GPRS wireless PC card 
modems while Lucent was to contribute marketing 
support.” 
SDC, Lexis Nexis 
Partner reputation 
Partner innovativeness 
8-item scale 
No. of patents citations received by the firm in the 
five years prior to the current alliance 
Fortune Magazine 
Database 
United States Patent and 
Trademark Office 
(USPTO) 
Firm size 
Firm age 
 
Macroeconomic condition 
(used in computation of 
selection correction, λ) 
Logarithm of firm assets 
Number of years from the founding date to the 
date of the current alliance 
30-day U.S. treasury bill return 
Compustat 
Mergent Online/Lexis 
Nexis 
CRSP 
 
 
 24
Focal Variables 
Net present value. The dependent measures of this study are the financial gains/losses or 
the net present value of the NPD announcement accruing to the partner firms. I 
computed financial gains as the product of short-term cumulative abnormal returns in the 
event window of (-1, +1) and the market capitalization of the firm 20 days before the 
alliance announcement, consistent with Chan et al (1997). The choice of financial 
gains/losses over short-term abnormal stock returns as the measure of the dependent 
variable was influenced by the following consideration. Short-term cumulative abnormal 
returns vary with firm size (Anand and Khanna 2000). That is, larger firms tend to have 
smaller cumulative abnormal returns and smaller firms tend to have greater cumulative 
abnormal returns. Therefore, the use of total financial gains/losses as the measure 
alleviates the scale problem associated with cumulative abnormal returns.   
I use the event study methodology to assess the abnormal returns accruing to firms 
entering into NPD alliances. I estimated the daily stock returns for every firm in the 
sample over a 240-day period prior to the event day using the market model (Brown and 
Warner 1985). The short-term return event study methodology rests on the assumption 
of efficient markets. That is, the market has sufficient information to gauge the 
effectiveness of a firm’s NPD alliance. Although concerns have been voiced regarding 
the validity of the assumption, prior research in strategic alliances has explicitly tested 
the efficient market hypothesis and shown that the short-term abnormal returns to 
alliance announcements are strongly correlated with firm performance as reported by 
managers (see Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002; Koh and Venkatraman 1991 for reviews). 
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The NPV of the firm following the NPD alliance announcement is computed using the 
market model for the event study (see Appendix 1 for details).  
Alliance experience. This measure is constructed as a count of the number of alliances in 
which the firm was involved from the beginning of 1993 until (and including) the focal 
alliance.5 It is worth noting that this count measure does not distinguish between 
different types of alliances such as narrow scope and broad scope alliances. However, 
this is not likely to be a concern because firms are likely to learn how to coordinate 
across organizational boundaries, select appropriate contract structures, and evaluate 
performance even in the case of narrow scope alliances (Sampson 2005). This count 
measure also does not distinguish between prior alliances that were successful and those 
that were unsuccessful, but because firms tend to learn from both successes and failures, 
this issue is not a problem as well.  
Alliance scope. I operationalize alliance scope in terms of the number of functional 
activities covered in the alliance. For example, I coded an alliance involving cooperation 
in a single functional area as one and an alliance involving cooperation in R&D, 
manufacturing, and marketing as three.  
Alliance type. I operationalize scale alliances in terms of the nature of the contribution 
made by alliance partners. I coded alliances in which firms jointly contributed resources 
to the NPD stage of the value chain as scale alliances, whereas alliances in which firms 
                                                          
5 The measure of firm alliance experience is left censored (i.e., alliances entered into by firms prior to 
1993 are ignored) and this could potentially introduce measurement error into this variable. From a 
practical standpoint, however, this measure is reasonable, given that asymmetric alliances by firms in 
information technology and telecommunication industries began gathering momentum only in the early 
1990s (Dalziel 2001).  Nevertheless, I subsequently estimated the model using an alternate measure, 
namely, total of past alliances (including those before 1993 all the way until 1985 for which, data were 
available).  The substantive results remained unchanged. 
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contributed resources to different stages of the value chain as link alliances was coded as 
link alliances. For instance, I coded alliances in which firms jointly developed products 
as scale alliances and alliances in which one firm contributed all the R&D resources and 
the other firm contributed all the marketing resources as link alliances.  
Partner reputation. Measures of firm reputation for the partners during 1993-2004 were 
obtained from the list of America’s most admired companies published by Fortune. 
Fortune’s annual survey rates firm reputation on a 11 point scale (0 denoting poor and 
10 denoting excellent) on eight characteristics, long- term investment value, financial 
soundness, wise use of corporate assets, quality of management, quality of 
products/services, innovativeness, ability to attract, develop, and keep talented people, 
and community and environmental responsibility. I use this measure because it is a 
valuable source for such a rich and abstract concept (see Fombrun and Shanley 1990; 
Houston and Johnson 2000). 
Partner innovativeness. The innovativeness of the partner firm was captured through a 
count of the patents citations received by the partner firm in the five years prior to the 
focal alliance date. I collected the data on patents filed by firms from the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) database. The USPTO provides detailed 
information on patents filed by information technology and telecommunication firms 
from the beginning of 1975. The innovation literature argues that a patent citation count 
measure is a better indicator of the technological position of the firm than R&D intensity 
(Griliches 1990) and has been widely used in prior research to measure innovation 
output (Acs and Audretsch 1988; Bound et al 1984).  
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Control Variables 
Firm size.  Consistent with prior studies (Stuart 2000), I control for the size of the firm 
by using the logarithm of the asset value of the firm at the time of the NPD alliance. The 
asset value of the firm was obtained from the Compustat database.  
Firm age. I operationalize firm age as the time elapsed from the date of founding of the 
firm to the date of announcement of the NPD alliance. The founding date of the firm was 
retrieved from the Mergent/Lexis Nexis databases. Controlling for firm age is necessary 
to ensure that the changes in firm values upon a NPD alliance announcement are not a 
consequence of aging and maturation of the partner firms. 
Year of alliance formation. To control for differences in financial gains among the firms 
due to relevant economic and business conditions in the year in which the alliance was 
formed, I use dummy variables for the years to capture these effects. 
Industry fixed effect. To control for variance in financial gains due to industry-specificity 
(Kumar et al. 2000), I use dummy variables for the industry to which the focal firm 
belongs.  
Firm fixed effect.  To control for variance in firm financial gains due to firm-specific 
characteristics, I use dummy variables for firms involved in multiple alliances in the 
dataset.     
Selection correction.  A potential econometric issue in estimating changes in shareholder 
value created by firm strategies or events is the bias that could arise on account of 
sample selection. In general, sample selection bias can occur when the criterion for 
selecting the observations is not independent of the outcome variables. In this study, I 
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observe that larger firms enter into asymmetric alliances more than smaller firms do 
during a given time period. Therefore, models that do not account for the sample 
selection and attrition processes could potentially result in biased predictor estimates 
(Greene 2002; Shane, Shankar, and Aravindakshan 2006). To obtain unbiased estimates, 
I use Lee’s (1983) generalization of a Heckman selection correction model that uses 
predicted probabilities for firm failure to generate a selection correction variable, λ given 
by: 
 
))(1/())](([ 1 tFtF kkkt −Φ= −φλ        (1)
  
 
where is the cumulative hazard function for firm k at time t, )(tFk φ is the standard 
normal density function and , the inverse of the standard normal distribution 
function (Lee 1983). 
1−Φ
The rate of alliance formation has been observed to be a function of the 
macroeconomic conditions for the business involved. That is, firms tend to form more 
alliances during periods of economic growth than during periods of economic decline 
(Park, Chen, and Gallagher 2002). Following Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) who 
explicitly examined the link between macroeconomic conditions and business cycles, I 
use the 30-day US treasury bill interest rate to compute the predicted probability of 
observing the event (i.e., asymmetric NPD alliance). I then include the selection 
correction term, ktλ , as a regressor in the model that captures firm value created through 
asymmetric NPD alliances. 
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Model Development 
Tests of hypotheses H1 to H6 entail analysis of 167 alliances involving 75 larger firms 
and 150 smaller firms in the data. I develop two equations, one for the larger firm and 
the other for the smaller firm. The dependent variable in both the equations is the change 
in the shareholder wealth or net present value created by the NPD alliance. The 
explanatory variables are the focal and control variables. The system of equations is 
given by:     
i
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where, i is the larger firm, j is the smaller firm,  
NPVi = Change in the shareholder wealth,  
FALEXP = Cumulative number of alliances entered into by the focal firm including the 
current alliance,  
ASCOPE = Number of functional areas covered in the alliance, 
ATYPE = 1 for scale alliance, 0 for link alliance, 
PALEXP = Cumulative number of alliances entered into by the partner firm including 
the current alliance,  
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PINNOV = Cumulative number of patent citations received by the alliance partner firm 
in the five years prior to the current alliance,  
PREP = Mean value of eight-items on a survey of the reputation of the alliance partner 
firm,  
FSIZE = Logarithm of firm assets, 
FAGE = Number of years from the firm’s inception date until the date of the current 
alliance, 
=λ selection control variable for the firm, 
IND = Dummy variable for the industry to which the focal firm belongs, 
YEARr  = Dummy variable for the year r, r ε {1,2,..9, each representing years 1994 
through 2004, 1993   is the base year, no alliance in 1996}, = 1 if r is the year in 
which the NPD alliance is announced, 0 otherwise, 
F = Dummy variable for each firm involved in multiple alliances in the data period, 
P = Number of industries represented by larger firms = 7, 
Q = Number of industries represented by smaller firms = 10, 
M = Number of larger firms with multiple alliances in the data period, 
N = Number of smaller firms with multiple alliances in the data period, and 
=ως , Error terms. 
 
Model Estimation 
Because the financial gains of the larger and smaller firms are generated from the same 
alliance, the system of equations could be correlated through their residuals. Using a 
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standard Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, the null hypothesis of 
independent residuals across equations (χ 2  = 25.45, p < 0.001) was rejected. Therefore, 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates of the system of two equations are more 
efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are, so I estimate the system using 
SUR (Zellner 1962).  Because the same firm may be involved in more than one NPD 
alliance, to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, I use the fixed effects approach 
(operationalized by dummy variables), consistent with Shane, Shankar, and 
Aravindakshan (2006).  Based on the number of multiple alliances found in the data, I 
include 11 firm fixed effects for the larger firm equation and three firm fixed effects for 
the smaller firm equation.  
 
RESULTS 
Tables 4 and 5 provide the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrices for the 
variables used in the study. From these tables, it is evident that there is considerable 
variance in firm value changes, the dependent measures for the study. The tables also 
suggest that the correlations between the independent variables in the equations are 
relatively small, the condition indexes are reasonable, and the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) are less than 10, alleviating concerns about potential multicollinearity.6 
 
 
6 The correlations relating to the industry dummies are not shown for lack of space.  They are, however, 
quite small, alleviating any concerns of potential multicollinearity. 
 TABLE 4 
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR LARGER FIRMS 
 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
NPV FALEXP SCOPE TYPE PALEXP PINN FSIZE FAGE λ Y94 Y95 Y97 Y98 Y99 Y00 Y01 Y02 Y03 
                     
NPV 50,722 145,875 1                  
FALEXP 4.40 4.92 0.45 1                 
SCOPE 0.57 0.04 0.13 0.00 1                
TYPE 0.41 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.24 1               
PALEXP 1.22 0.52 0.16 0.05 0.14 -0.01 1              
PINN 16.14 49.93 0.11 0.18 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1             
FSIZE 3.96 0.80 0.11 0.59 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.04 1            
FAGE 44.58 33.89 -0.07 0.35 -0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.08 0.63 1           
λ 1.38 0.02 -0.11 -0.13 0.02 0.22 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 0.08 1          
Y94 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.16 0.04 0.07 1         
Y95 0.04 0.01 -0.13 0.23 -0.08 0.06 -0.03 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.14 -0.02 1        
Y97 0.06 0.02 0.26 -0.00 0.05 0.12 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.17 -0.17 -0.04 -0.03 1       
Y98 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 1      
Y99 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.17 -0.04 -0.15 0.14 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 1     
Y00 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.04 -0.21 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.23 -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 1    
Y01 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.11 -0.13 1   
Y02 0.23 0.03 -.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.06 0.17 0.14 -0.04 -0.20 -0.10 -0.09 -0.14 -0.13 -0.20 -0.25 -0.19 1  
Y03 0.12 0.03 -0.13 -0.11 0.06 0.10 0.11 -0.07 0.02 0.07 0.19 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 -0.10 -0.20 1 
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TABLE 5   
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SMALLER FIRMS 
 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
NPV FALEXP SCOPE TYPE PALEXP PREP FSIZE FAGE λ Y94 Y95 Y97 Y98 Y99 Y00 Y01 Y02 Y03 
                     
NPV 13,01 86,85 1                  
FALEXP 1.22 0.52 0.47 1                 
ASCOPE 0.57 0.04 0.04 0.05 1                
ATYPE 0.41 0.04 0.14 -0.08 0.28 1               
PALEXP 4.40 4.92 0.20 0.30 -0.03 -0.06 1              
PREP 6.93 1.04 0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.18 1             
FSIZE 2.04 0.76 0.26 0.39 0.14 0.11 0.26 0.08 1            
FAGE 13.49 11.64 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.17 -0.03 0.20 1           
λ 1.78 0.01 -0.15 -0.10 -0.08 0.19 0.06 -0.28 0.07 -0.04 1          
Y94 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.20 0.01 -0.04 0.40 1         
Y95 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 0.03 0.36 -0.13 0.05 -0.06 0.59 -0.03 1        
Y97 0.06 0.02 0.63 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.09 -0.01 0.21 -0.11 -0.21 -0.03 -0.05 1       
Y98 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.16 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 1      
Y99 0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.14 -0.04 -0.22 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 1     
Y00 0.14 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.24 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 1    
Y01 0.10 0.02 -0.03 0.13 -0.02 -0.18 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 0.03 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12 1   
Y02 0.23 0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.07 -0.20 0..24 -0.16 0.00 -0.49 -0.08 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.24 -0.21 -0.21 1  
Y03 0.12 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.16 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19 1 
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Hypotheses Tests and Controls 
To test the hypotheses, I compared three models for both larger and smaller firms. The 
results appear in Tables 6, 7, and 8. Model 1 captures the effects of firm characteristics 
on the financial gains to larger and smaller firms. Model 2 captures the effects of firm 
characteristics and alliance characteristics on the financial gains to larger and smaller 
firms. Model 3 captures the effects of firm characteristics, alliance characteristics, and 
partner characteristics on the financial gains to the larger and smaller firms.7 Table 6 
suggests that the explained variance for larger firms in Model 3 (adjusted R2 = 0.47) is 
significantly higher than the explained variance in Model 1 (adjusted R2 = 0.27) and that 
in Model 2 (adjusted R2 = 0.29). Similarly, Table 7 suggests that the explained variance 
for smaller firms in Model 3 (adjusted R2 = 0.28) is significantly higher than the 
explained variance in Model 1 (adjusted R2 = 0.20) and that in Model 2 (adjusted R2 = 
0.24). Therefore, I focus only on the parameter estimates in Model 3 in discussing the 
results. Table 8 shows the results of the tests of differences between the corresponding 
coefficients for the larger and smaller firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 I compared models for larger and smaller firms by altering the sequence of entry of firm, alliance and 
partner characteristics into the regression equations. In all these comparison checks, the model with firm, 
alliance and partner characteristics outperformed all the rival models.   
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TABLE 6   
FINANCIAL VALUE FROM ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCES: SEEMINGLY 
UNRELATED REGRESSIONS FOR LARGER FIRMS 
 
 Model 1 
(N=156) 
       Model 2 
       (N=145) 
Model 3 
(N=102) 
Firm alliance experience 0.24 (0.06)***  0.27 (0.05)*** 0.15 (0.06)** 
Alliance scope  53.71 (22.09) ** 40.80 (19.00) ** 
Alliance type  15.75 (12.54) 24.71 (22.00) 
Partner alliance experience    6.21 (2.43)*** 
Partner innovativeness   0.01 (0.00)** 
Control variables    
Firm size 13.64 (18.83) 19.11 (13.17) - 0.00 (0.00)** 
Firm age 0.27 (0.35) - 0.53 (0.41) - 0.16 (0.27) 
Selection correction (λ) - 137.03 (51.44)** - 134.26 (46.14)*** - 166.07 (38.53)*** 
Firm fixed effects 4 out of 11 fixed 
effects significant* 
4 out of 11 fixed effects 
significant* 
4 out of 11 fixed effects 
significant* 
Chi-square (χ2) 63.82*** 62.40*** 116.80*** 
R2 (Overall) 0.27 0.29 0.47 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent measure is the change in the firm’s market value 
measured in millions of dollars. Estimates of year and industry dummies are insignificant, so they are not 
shown in the table. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7  
 FINANCIAL VALUE FROM ASYMMETRIC ALLIANCES: SEEMINGLY 
UNRELATED REGRESSIONS FOR SMALLER FIRMS 
 
 
 
Model 1 
(N=156) 
Model 2 
(N=145) 
Model 3 
(N=102) 
Firm alliance experience 2.60 (0.43)*** 2.64 (0.73)*** 3.15 (0.64)*** 
Alliance scope  7.85 (5.84) 7.18 (6.13) 
Alliance type  25.98 (11.35)** 40.61 (19.24)** 
Partner alliance experience   0.07 (0.19) 
Partner reputation   - 7.60 (8.72) 
Control variables    
Firm size - 0.00 (0.00)** - 0.00 (0.56) - 0.00 (0.45) 
Firm age - 0.01 (0.48) - 0.00 (0.83) - 0.37 (0.79) 
Selection correction (λ) - 3.24 (2.66) - 10.04 (5.98)* - 42.03 (24.22)* 
Firm fixed effects 0 out of 3 fixed 
effects significant* 
0 out of 3 fixed effects  
significant* 
0 out of 3 fixed effects  
significant* 
Chi-square (χ2) 34.38*** 37.80*** 39.57*** 
R2 (Overall) 0.20 0.24 0.28 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent measure is the change in the firm’s market value 
measured in millions of dollars. Estimates of year and industry dummies are insignificant, so they are not 
shown in the table. 
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TABLE 8   
TEST OF EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN LARGER AND 
SMALLER FIRMS 
 
Variable  Test Statistic (χ2, d. f.= 1) 
Firm alliance experience 21.53*** 
Alliance scope 5.22** 
Alliance type 0.55 
Partner alliance experience  9.70*** 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01.  The dependent measure is the change in the firm’s market value 
measured in millions of dollars. A significant chi-square statistic implies that the coefficient for the larger 
firm is significantly different from that for the smaller firm.  
 
 
 
 
H1 states that alliance experience will exhibit a positive relationship with financial gains 
to each partner firm. The results from Table 6 suggest that the parameter estimate of firm 
alliance experience is positive and significant (p < 0.05) for the larger firm. Specifically, 
every additional alliance by a larger firm adds approximately $0.15 million to the 
shareholder value of the larger firm. From Table 7, the parameter estimate for the effect 
of prior alliance experience is also positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001) for 
the smaller firm. However, every additional alliance by a smaller firm contributes 
approximately $3.15 million to the value of the smaller firm—much higher than that for 
the larger firm (p < 0.001 from Table 7). Thus, H1 is supported, but importantly, the size 
of the effect is asymmetric across the larger and smaller firms. 
H2 states that the financial gains to the larger firm will be greater for broad scope 
NPD alliances than they are for narrow scope NPD alliances. The parameter estimate of 
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alliance scope is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05), supporting H2. 
Specifically, a broad scope alliance increases the market value of the larger firm by 
$40.80 million relative to a narrow scope alliance. This effect is substantially significant 
when compared to the mean financial gains to the larger firm ($50.72 million). Although 
I did not have a formal hypothesis for the effect of alliance scope on the financial gains 
for a smaller firm, the results suggest that the coefficient of alliance scope for smaller 
firms is statistically insignificant (p > 0.10). That is, the difference between the smaller 
firm’s market value changes between broad and narrow scope NPD alliances is 
indistinguishable from zero. In addition, the results from Table 7 suggests that alliance 
scope has a positive and significantly higher impact (p < 0.01) on the larger firm’s gains 
than it has on the smaller firm’s gains.  
H3a argues that the financial gains to larger firms will be greater for link alliances 
than they are for scale alliances. Contrary to H3a, I find that the effect of alliance type on 
change in shareholder value of the larger firm is statistically insignificant (p > 0.10).  For 
a link alliance to have a greater impact on change in shareholder value of a larger firm 
than a scale alliance, it would have to bring a sufficiently high level of complementary 
competency to NPD. The smaller firms in the data perhaps did not bring such high 
complementary value to the larger firms.  
H3b argues that the financial gains to smaller firms will be greater for scale alliances 
than they are for link alliances. The results suggest that the parameter estimate of 
alliance type is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05), supporting H3b. 
Specifically, a scale alliance contributes $40.61 million more to the value of the smaller 
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firm than does a link alliance. This contribution is considerably large when compared to 
the mean increase in shareholder value of $13.01 million for the smaller firm. However, 
the results from Table 8 suggest that the parameter estimate of alliance type for the 
smaller firm is not significantly different from that for the larger firm (p > 0.10). In 
addition, I tested for possible interaction effects of alliance type and alliance scope on 
the financial gains.  The interaction effect turned out to be statistically insignificant (p > 
0.10), so I did not include it in the final model. To sum up the effects of alliance 
characteristics, I find considerable asymmetries between larger and smaller firms with 
regard to the impact of alliance scope, but not so with regard to alliance type.  
With regard to Hypothesis 4a about the relationship between partner alliance 
experience and financial gains to the larger firm, the parameter estimate of partner 
alliance experience is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. In terms of magnitude, 
every additional past alliance of the smaller partner firm increases the financial gains to 
the larger firm by approximately $6.21 million. Thus, H4a is strongly supported. 
However, the effect of partner alliance experience on the financial gains for smaller 
firms is statistically insignificant (p > 0.10). Thus, H4b is not supported. Consistent with 
H4a and H4b results, the parameter estimates from Table 7 suggest that partner alliance 
experience has a positive and significantly higher (p < 0.01) impact on the larger firm’s 
gains than it has on the smaller firm’s gains.  
H5 argues that the financial gains to smaller firms are greater when partnering with 
larger firms of high reputation than they are when teaming up with larger firms of low 
reputation. However, the results suggest that the effect of partner reputation on the 
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financial gains of smaller firms is not statistically significant (p > 0.10). Hence, H5 is not 
supported.8 According to H6, the financial gains to larger firms will be greater when 
partnering with innovative smaller firms than when partnering with non-innovative 
smaller firms. The effect of partner innovativeness is significant (p < 0.05), supporting 
H6. Figures 2, 3, 4 & 5 depict the asymmetric gains to larger and smaller firms from 
NPD alliances. 
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8 The reputation ratings for larger firms were available in the Fortune database only for 130 firms. 
Therefore, we do not rule out the possibility that the inability to detect the positive effects of reputation on 
smaller firm value may be due to lack of statistical power. In addition, we recognize that the use of a 
global measure of reputation could have lead to statistical insignificance (Fryxell and Wang 1994). 
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The effects of the control variables are either in the expected directions or are 
insignificant. Firm size is negatively associated with the gains of the larger firm (p < 
0.05), but is not significantly related to the gains of the smaller firm (p > 0.10).  Firm age 
is not statistically significant for both larger and smaller firms (p > 0.10).  Selection 
correction is negative and significant for both larger and smaller firms (p < 0.10), 
underscoring the need to control for selection bias. None of the year or industry 
dummies, however, is significant (p > 0.10). Finally, four of the 11 firm fixed effects are 
significant in the larger firm equation (p < 0.10), but none are significant in the smaller 
firm equation (p > 0.10).  Thus, controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity is 
important for larger firms, but not for smaller firms. 
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I performed several analyses to ensure the robustness of the findings. A summary of 
these analyses and their results is reported in Appendix 2.  Details on an analysis of 
long-term returns to NPD alliance performed as a robustness check appears in Appendix 
3. Overall, these additional analyses checks reveal that the analyses and results are 
robust. 
A summary of the results appears in Table 9. Firm alliance experience has a positive 
and significant effect on the financial gains of both larger and smaller firms. However, 
the similarity between larger and smaller firms ends there. The effects of alliance scope, 
alliance type, and other partner characteristics on financial gains are asymmetric across 
larger and smaller firms. Larger firms gain more from broad-scope alliances, but smaller 
firms’ gains are not related to alliance scope.  In contrast, smaller firms gain from scale 
alliances, but larger firms’ gains are not related to alliance type.  Partner alliance 
experience has a positive influence on the gains of the larger firm, whereas it is not 
related to the gains of the smaller firm. Furthermore, partner innovativeness has a 
positive influence on the gains of the larger firm, but partner reputation has no effect on 
the gains of the smaller firm.  Finally, although firm alliance experience has a positive 
effect on the financial gains of both larger and smaller firms, the absolute value of gains 
is much higher for the smaller firms than it is for the larger firms. 
 
 43
TABLE 9   
SUMMARY OF RESULTS: STUDY ONE 
 
Predicted Effects Results Factors 
(Hypotheses) Larger 
Firm 
Smaller 
Firm 
Larger 
Firm 
Smaller 
Firm 
Relative 
Coefficients 
 
Brief Rationale 
Firm alliance 
experience  
(H1) 
 
+ + + + β1 < γ1 Although prior alliance 
experience adds value to both 
larger and smaller firms, every 
additional NPD alliance is 
more beneficial to the smaller 
firm as it provides more critical 
information to investors 
regarding the smaller firm’s 
future revenues. 
Alliance scope 
(H2) 
+ N. P + N. S β2 > γ2 Larger firms tend to gain 
disproportionately from broad-
scope NPD alliances because of 
the greater opportunity for 
private gains. 
Alliance type 
(Scale versus 
link) 
(H3a & H3b) 
- + N. S + β3 = γ3 Greater contribution of 
resources by the smaller firm to 
downstream activities of NPD 
shifts the balance to the middle 
resulting in both the larger and 
smaller firms gaining equally 
from scale alliances.  
Partner alliance 
experience 
(H4a & H4b) 
+ + + N. S β4 > γ4 Partner alliance experience 
matters more for the larger firm 
because unlike for the smaller 
firm, it helps screen partner 
firms with unproven track 
records (typically smaller 
firms). 
Partner 
innovativeness 
(H5) 
 
+ N. P + N. A N. A Partner innovativeness matters 
from the standpoint of the 
larger firm as it provides new 
information to investors about 
the quality of NPD effort 
pursued by the larger, well-
established firm. 
Partner 
reputation 
(H6) 
N. P  + N. A + N. A It may be unrealistic to expect a 
transfer of reputation from the 
larger firm to the smaller firm 
without accounting for the 
tangible resources contributed 
by the larger firm to the NPD 
alliance. 
Notes: N. S – Not significant, N. A - Not applicable, N. P – No prediction 
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 THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The first main finding from this study is that an asymmetric NPD alliance is not a win-
lose partnership, but a win-win or shareholder value-adding alliance for both the larger 
and smaller partner firms. Although previous studies have not examined shareholder 
value changes to NPD alliances, they have suggested that the value of one partner firm 
may improve at the expense of the other partner.  The findings also show that the 
magnitudes and drivers of the financial gains are different across the larger and smaller 
firms.  
Prior research provides only partial insights into the effects of firm characteristics, 
alliance characteristics and partner characteristics on firm value, albeit not in the NPD 
context. This study extends prior research by studying all the effects in a single 
framework and by empirically showing that the relative influences of these 
characteristics on the firm values of smaller and larger firms vary substantially. While 
prior research seems to suggest that alliance characteristics matter equally to the partner 
firms in an alliance, the motivation for firms to enter into asymmetric alliances are 
different for larger and smaller firms. Broad scope alliances are intrinsically complex 
and uncertain, pose greater threats of opportunism, and result in frequent ex-post alliance 
changes (Oxley and Sampson 2004; Reuer, Zollo, and Singh 2002). The results suggest 
that broad scope NPD alliances create greater financial value for larger firms than do 
narrow scope NPD alliances. However, the effect for smaller firms is not significantly 
different between broad scope alliances and narrow scope alliances. Likewise, I find that 
smaller firms tend to gain more from scale alliances than they do from link alliances. 
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The finding regarding the smaller firm is new and the result relating to the larger firm is 
consistent with prior research. This shows that as long as the alliance profits are high, 
there is an incentive for the larger firm to enter into the alliance, whereas the incentive 
for the smaller firm to enter into the alliance depends on how the benefits from 
technology development would be shared (Lerner and Merges 1998; Veugelers and 
Kesteloot 1996).  
These findings have several useful implications for managerial practice. For the 
larger firm to gain from its partnership with the smaller firm, the alliance agreement 
needs to be broad-based involving cooperation in more than one functional area. In 
contrast, for the smaller firm to gain from its partnership with the larger firm, greater 
pooling of resources through a scale alliance is desirable as it increases the opportunity 
for symmetric revenue sharing and lowers the possibility of exploitation by the larger 
partner.  
Prior research also suggests that alliance experience of the firm creates value because 
of learning effects (Anand and Khanna 2000; Sampson 2005). Consistent with these 
research findings, I also find that alliance experience contributes to the financial value of 
both larger and smaller firms. However, I find that the magnitude of the gains differs 
considerably across larger and smaller firms. I find that every additional alliance creates 
more financial value for smaller firms than it does for larger firms. A smaller change in 
the value of the larger firm due to firm alliance experience is consistent with the fact that 
the stock market is well informed about the strategies of larger firms and an additional 
past alliance by the larger firm may be insufficient to result in a large change in the 
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firm’s value. In contrast, the stock market has considerably less information about the 
strategies of smaller firms and hence, every additional alliance with a larger firm aids the 
investor in resolving the uncertainty related to its future cash flows. The implication for 
a manager of a smaller firm is that every additional past alliance with other firms not 
only improves its chances of survival, but also signals the firm’s financial potential to 
investors. Alliances with larger, well-established firms are indeed the path to growth for 
smaller, entrepreneurial firms. Managers in larger firms need to note that every 
additional past alliance is valued lower than that for a smaller firm as it does not provide 
a significantly new piece of information to investors. Perhaps, larger firms tend to gain 
more from their ability to manage a portfolio of alliances (Wuyts, Dutta, and Stremersch  
2004) than they do from incremental alliances with smaller firms. Indeed, large firms 
such as Hewlett-Packard and Eli Lilly have mastered alliances by establishing 
exhaustive knowledge stores that aid in partner selection as well as alliance design 
(Johnson, Sohi, and Grewal 2004; Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002). 
A rich body of literature suggests that endorsement by a larger, powerful firm 
enables smaller firms to overcome their liability of smallness that stems from their lack 
of reputation (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; Gulati and Higgins 2003; Stuart 
2000). Interestingly, I find that neither partner alliance experience nor partner reputation 
has a significant impact on the financial gains to the smaller firm in the sample. 
However, the lack of empirical support for H4b and H5 suggests that larger firms 
partnering with inexperienced or less innovative smaller firms tend to be viewed as less 
valuable. An implication is that asymmetric NPD alliances are characterized by 
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asymmetric information. Specifically, the characteristics of the smaller partner play a 
crucial role in reducing the adverse selection problem faced by the larger firm when 
selecting a smaller alliance partner. However, I find that the larger partner’s attributes do 
not matter from the standpoint of the smaller firm’s market value. These findings imply 
that in selecting smaller firms with whom to partner, larger firms need to pay closer 
attention to their partner’s attributes (e.g., partner alliance experience and partner 
innovativeness) because of their ability to reduce investor uncertainty about the quality 
of smaller firms.   
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Like most empirical research, this study suffers from certain limitations that can be 
addressed by future research. The first limitation is the absence of granular information 
pertaining to alliance agreements (e.g., terms and conditions, deal value and resource 
contributions by the larger and smaller partners). Future research could collect and use 
such information. Second, the sample for this study is limited to publicly traded U.S. 
firms in the information technology and telecommunication industries. Future research 
needs to examine whether the findings generalize to other industries characterized by 
asymmetric NPD alliances (e.g., biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries). Third, 
although stock prices provide good estimates of future performance, they can be limiting 
in some respects. For example, the underlying assumption that stockholders are the only 
stakeholders is somewhat restrictive. Future research could incorporate comprehensive 
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performance measures by including the views of multiple stakeholders as well as by 
taking into account the actual cash flows realized by firms. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DETERMINANTS OF NEW PRODUCT ALLIANCE TERMINATIONS 
OVERVIEW 
Managing multiple new product partnerships is a complex endeavor requiring 
incumbents to make numerous decisions periodically. One such decision pertains to 
pulling the plug on ‘less promising’ NPAs and diverting resources to other NPAs in the 
portfolio. Against this backdrop, a number of research questions merit investigation. 
What are the determinants of NPA terminations? How does market focus and technology 
focus of the incumbent’s NPA portfolio impact NPA terminations? Are NPA 
terminations influenced by the age of the incumbent’s product portfolio? Does 
competition in product markets increase or decrease the hazard of termination? Are NPA 
terminations impacted by its partner’s financial conditions?  
The hypotheses are tested on a unique database comprised of 401 new product 
alliances involving 24 pharmaceutical firms during 1990-2005.  NPA terminations are 
modeled using Cox’s proportional hazard specification that accounts for the unobserved 
heterogeneity of firms with multiple NPAs (through gamma distributed frailty effects), 
competing risks and ties among NPA duration times (using Efron approximation).  The 
results suggest that NPA terminations are not made in isolation but are influenced by 
composition of the firm’s portfolio. The results relating to firm portfolio characteristics 
suggest that while firms with greater product category focus have lower hazard of 
termination, firms with greater technology focus have higher hazard of termination. In 
addition, the hazard of termination is lower for firms with aging portfolios. The results 
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related to product-market factors suggest that highly competitive product-markets, firms 
tend to continue with the existing NPA rather than terminating it. The results relating to 
partner-specific factors are more complex. Partner value has a U-shaped impact on the 
hazard of NPA termination. The hazard of termination is lowest at moderate levels of 
partner value. The implications of the findings for future research and management 
practice are outlined.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is well-known that incumbent firms in high technology industries (e.g., 
pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, information technology) typically pursue multiple new 
product alliances with entrepreneurial firms to bolster their product pipelines. Managing 
multiple new product partnerships is a complex endeavor requiring incumbents to make 
numerous decisions periodically. One such decision pertains to pulling the plug on ‘less 
promising’ NPAs and diverting resources to other NPAs in the portfolio (Bordley 2003; 
Hauser, Tellis, and Griffin 2006). Marion Merell Dow, a pharmaceutical firm, entered 
into a 10-year agreement with Alteon in 1990 to develop and market Pimagedine and 
selected compounds. The scope of the 10-year agreement included a R&D collaboration, 
$20M funding for Pimagedine's clinical development and provisions for the joint 
promotion and sale of the product in the U.S., Canada and Western Europe. However, 
Marion Merrell Dow ended its alliance with Alteon much before the completion of the 
ten year period. According to managers in Alteon, any termination other than an 
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unanticipated failure of the product development program was never envisioned by the 
alliance partners (Van Brunt 1999).  
NPAs can be terminated for a number of reasons such as when partners have 
accomplished the objectives or when the NPA technology has failed. Yet, casual 
observation suggests that incumbents manage and balance their portfolio by weeding out 
NPAs that do not fit its strategic objectives (Chan, Nickerson, and Owan 2007). NPA 
terminations are important from an incumbent’s perspective for atleast two reasons. 
First, NPA terminations impact how incumbents allocate resources to its existing and 
new R&D partnerships and can lower a firm’s NPD costs by as much as 65% (Cooper, 
Edgett, and Kleinschmidt 2001). This is significant because new product development 
costs continue to escalate in a number of industries. Industry reports suggest that the cost 
of developing new drugs has increased to $800 million in 2000 (Dimasi 2000). Second, 
large firms that are strategic in terms of which R&D alliances to terminate tend to have 
higher R&D output and lower R&D output volatility compared to firms that do not 
consider the relationship of the NPA to the overall portfolio (Cockburn and Henderson 
1996; Kavadias and Chao 2006).  
NPA portfolio management is defined as a ‘dynamic decision process in which a 
business’ list of active new product partnerships is constantly revised and updated’ 
(Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt 1998). NPA portfolio management issues such as 
go/kill investment decisions are encountered by firms in a number of industries such as 
information technology, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals. In high technology 
markets, the breadth of product-markets targeted and the number of technologies 
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employed represent important strategic choices for incumbents that impacts its 
innovation output and profitability (Grewal, Ding, and Liechty 2006; Wuyts, Dutta, and 
Stremersch 2004; Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt 1998). However, incumbents are 
constrained in the choices of product-markets and technologies they pursue by the state 
of its existing product pipeline. For instance, reports in the pharmaceutical industry 
suggest that Merck’s threshold for continuing/abandoning new product partnerships has 
changed significantly between 1980 and 2003. Buoyed by a strong portfolio and 
relatively less competition in 1980, Merck pursued an aggressive strategy of pursuing 
high risk-high return NPAs. However, with fewer successful candidates emerging from 
its alliance and product portfolio, by 2003 Merck shifted its focus to pursuing low risk-
low return NPAs (Bellucci 2005). Such shifts in preferences are not unique to a firm or 
an industry. Generally, any firm that is likely to experience a decline in revenues 
because of expiration of the commercialized products faces similar pressures. Recent 
models by Grossman, Hart and Moore (reviewed in Hart 1995) suggest that structure of 
technology alliances is predicted by the difficulty faced by young-technology firms in 
raising capital from public and private investors because of information asymmetries 
surrounding its projects. Furthermore, the wide fluctuations in the availability of capital 
from public and private investors render writing complete contracts almost impossible in 
such industries. 
The research questions I seek to address are as follows. What are the determinants of 
NPA terminations? How does product category focus and technology focus of the 
incumbent’s NPA portfolio impact NPA terminations? Are NPA terminations influenced 
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by the age of the incumbent’s product portfolio? Does competition in product markets 
increase or decrease the hazard of termination? Are NPA terminations impacted by 
changes in the partner’s financial conditions?  
This study seeks to make the following contributions to the literature on NPAs. First, 
this is one of the early studies to examine how NPA termination decisions of incumbents 
are influenced by the firm’s portfolio (i.e., NPA and product) characteristics. While prior 
research acknowledges that firms need to manage their NPA portfolios as a strategic 
goal (Wind and Mahajan 1997; Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt 1998), empirical 
research linking portfolio characteristics to NPA terminations is virtually absent. By 
investigating interdependencies in the portfolio, this study sheds insights into which 
NPAs in a firm’s portfolio have higher and lower hazards of termination. Second, I 
empirically investigate the role of competition on new product alliance terminations. 
Specifically, I examine two distinct sources of competition that are likely to impact NPA 
terminations: intra-alliance (i.e., partner value) and inter-alliance competition (i.e., 
product market rivalry). While prior research has examined either intra-alliance rivalry 
(Kogut 1991) or inter-alliance rivalry (Pisano 1990), this is the first study to examine 
both competitive effects in the same framework. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The issue of NPA terminations is related directly and indirectly to a number of literature 
streams. First, the product management literature in marketing has for long advocated a 
stage-gate approach for assessing whether projects are to be advanced or discontinued. 
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In this approach, gates represent the nodes where cross-functional teams make go/no-go 
decisions based on economic analysis (e.g., NPV) based on criteria such as market 
attractiveness, technical feasibility, new product advantage etc (Wind and Mahajan 
1997; Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt 1998; Griffin 1997). There is also a stream of 
research suggesting that NPD continuation and termination decisions are attributable to 
managerial biases (Boulding, Morgan, and Staelin 1997; Schmidt and Calantone 2002). 
However, the focus of these research streams is on new products developed internally 
and not on new products developed through partnerships and collaborations.  
Second, there is a large body of literature that views investment or divestment 
choices of firms as real options. Investments in new product alliances in high technology 
settings resemble real options since such environments are characterized by uncertainty, 
long time horizons and asymmetric pay-off distributions (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; 
McGrath and Nerkar 2004). Prior research has considered investment in an R&D 
alliance to be an isolated option and the overall value of a portfolio of options as linearly 
additive (i.e., sum of the values of individual options). This is limiting because product-
markets are characterized by interdependencies and therefore, a portfolio approach that 
allows for the possibility of correlated options is more realistic (i.e., R&D alliances) 
(Wuyts, Dutta, and Stremersch 2004; Devinney and Stewart 1988; Vassolo, Anand and 
Folta 2004).  
Building on prior research in new product development and real options, I argue that 
new product alliance terminations are attributable to  1) the firm’s portfolio 
characteristics (i.e., product category focus [Cockburn and Henderson 1996; Grewal, 
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Ding, and Liechty 2006], technology focus [Wuyts, Dutta, and Stremersch 2004; Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996], product portfolio maturity [Higgins and Rodriguez 2006; 
Chan, Nickerson, and Owan 2007]), 2) product-market characteristics (i.e., product 
market rivalry [Pisano 1990; Folta and Miller 2002]) and 3) partner characteristics (i.e., 
partner value [Folta and Miller 2002]). Figure 6 depicts the conceptual model of the 
determinants of NPA terminations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6 
DETERMINANTS OF NPA TERMINATIONS: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
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Firm Portfolio Characteristics 
Product category focus. Product category focus refers to the firm’s allocation of effort to 
product categories. Firms vary considerably in their breadth product markets they seek to 
pursue. The rationale for firms to target multiple product markets is to diversify the risk 
associated with product-markets. At the same time, other firms focus on fewer product 
markets in an effort to develop category-specific experience. For example, Wyeth has 
been noted for its focused product pipeline (e.g., neuroscience) whereas Pfizer’s pipeline 
is known for the breadth of product markets targeted. Although projects in the same 
category might imply higher risk (DiMasi 2000), complementarities exist within the sub-
categories, which are determined by the diseases or the conditions that the drugs are used 
to treat. This is primarily because knowledge gained through research in one project area 
may be of direct relevance to other projects within the same category. Therefore, while a 
firm may seek to pursue new products for specific applications within a product 
category, uncertainty and serendipity in the early stages of the NPD process often results 
in uncovering promising candidates for other areas in the same category. For instance, 
within the hematologics category, the indications of drugs in Estrogens/Progestins and 
contraceptives overlap considerably (Acemoglu and Linn 2004). However, the benefits 
of scope may not materialize in diverse product categories where the knowledge to be 
transmitted is sticky (Cockburn and Henderson 1996). Given the existence of such ex-
ante uncertainties, investments made in a particular product category are deployable 
more within the same product category than across diverse product categories. More 
generally, partial use of investments across R&D alliances has been shown to lead to 
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super-additive outcomes for the portfolio of options (Vassolo, Anand, and Folta 2004). 
Building on these arguments, I expect NPAs in product markets that overlap 
considerably with the firm’s NPA portfolio will have a lower likelihood of termination. 
Therefore: 
H7: The hazard of NPA termination will be lower for alliances in product categories 
characterized by a greater overlap with the firm’s NPA portfolio. 
 
Technology focus. A firm’s technology focus refers to the degree to which a firm 
employs similar or related sets of technologies to pursue innovation. In the context of 
internal R&D, incumbent firms face inertial pressures and are susceptible to the ‘core 
rigidity trap’ that stems from the use of similar technologies (Leonard-Barton 1992). For 
example in the optical industry, incumbents face the challenge of overcoming current 
storage limits of today’s DVD standard by using laser pickup technology that utilize 
inert gases (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). However, discovery of new products often 
requires exploring diverse and novel technological paths. One of the reasons incumbent 
firms enter into new product alliances is because it provides access to multiple 
technologies and enables them to overcome the constraints of localized search. Although 
developing technologically diverse NPA portfolios is beneficial for successful 
innovation, pursuing multiple distinct technological domains requires higher investments 
and lowers profitability (Wuyts, Dutta, and Stremersch 2004). According to the real 
options framework, if a firm has a set of NPAs employing the same technologies, the 
overall net present value of the portfolio of NPAs is lower because of the opportunity to 
switch (Vassolo, Anand, and Folta 2004). Therefore, I expect that NPAs with 
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technologies that overlap considerably with the firm’s NPA portfolio would have a 
higher likelihood of being terminated.   
H8: The hazard of NPA termination is lower for alliances based on technologies 
characterized by a greater overlap with the firm’s NPA portfolio. 
 
Product portfolio age. A firm’s product portfolio age refers to the maturity of the firm’s 
product pipeline. A firm’s product portfolio age is dynamic because a number of 
candidates in the firm’s NPA portfolio might ultimately reach the market. Published 
reports in the business press suggest that the maturity of the product pipeline impacts the 
strategic behavior of incumbents in high technology markets. For example, a Wall Street 
Journal article states: 
“And in a radical change, some companies are shedding their Hollywood-style focus 
on finding a few big hits -- a longtime practice that left them vulnerable when patents 
expired -- in favor of developing a broader range of drugs. Ultimately, that change 
could yield drugs aimed at smaller markets, and for rarer illnesses, which might have 
been shelved in the past.” (Tanouye and Langreth 1997).  
Recently, empirical evidence has been offered to suggest that thinning product pipelines 
or deteriorating R&D productivity forces incumbents to acquire research intensive 
partners with promising product candidates (Higgins and Rodriguez 2006). Likewise, 
insights from the product management literature suggests that firms with maturing 
product portfolios lower the threshold for advancing R&D projects (Chan, Nickerson, 
and Owan 2007; Gino and Pisano 2006). Although large firms with multiple candidates 
in development would suggest a lower likelihood of advancing NPAs forward, a firm 
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with a mature product portfolio is likely to experience a decline in its revenues because 
of generic competition. In such situations, we expect that firms would be ‘less tough’ on 
terminating NPAs. The reason firms lower their NPA termination criteria in the face of 
an aging product portfolio is to avoid incurring adjustment costs of co-specialized 
investments such as those on distribution and sales force  (Chan, Nickerson, and Owan 
2007). Based on these arguments, I advance the following hypothesis: 
H9: The hazard of NPA termination will be lower for alliances of firms with aging 
product portfolios. 
 
Product-Market Characteristics 
Product market rivalry. Product-market rivalry refers to the extent of competition a firm 
faces in a given product-market. It has been recently argued that in fiercely contested 
product markets, firms are unlikely to buy out partners because preemption by rivals 
might reduce the value of the underlying growth option (Folta and Miller 2002). 
However, product-markets are fiercely contested because the target market is potentially 
attractive in terms of future revenues (McGrath and Nerkar 2004). In such markets, a 
firm’s decision to terminate NPAs is influenced by whether it can find a new partner in 
the same product-market. Increased product-market rivalry implies that the incumbent’s 
ability to pursue more NPAs in the product market is reduced considerably because most 
of the entrepreneurial firms are already engaged in NPAs in the same product-market 
with well-established firms. Large firms tend to avoid entering into NPAs with smaller 
firms who have active NPAs in the same product-markets with other large firms for 
atleast two reasons (Pisano 1990). First, the know-how generated from a R&D project 
 
 60
may be closely linked with what is created in other R&D projects. Therefore, 
incumbents face the hazard of the new entrant selling the know-how from the project to 
its rivals in the product-market (Pisano 1990). Secondly, even if there is no diversion of 
efforts by the entrant to other projects, incumbents will find it extremely difficult to 
attach claims to much of the intellectual property from the specific new product alliance. 
Based on these arguments, I expect incumbents in fiercely contested product markets 
will be less likely to abandon NPAs.  
H10: The hazard of NPA termination will be lower for alliances in product markets 
characterized by high levels of rivalry.  
 
Partner Characteristics 
Partner value. Partner value refers to the financial value accorded to the partner by 
external entities such as venture capital companies and financial markets. Changes in the 
new entrant’s financial position are likely to impact the hazard of termination because of 
two different reasons. On the one hand, although the NPA between the firms may have 
existed for some time, there is still uncertainty regarding the viability and quality of the 
NPD program of the smaller partner. In this situation, finances raised by the smaller 
partner from external sources serves as an endorsement of its NPD capability. On the 
other hand, the R&D literature suggests that high levels of external funding received by 
the smaller partner (i.e., research unit) often results in the majority of control rights 
getting assigned to the smaller firm (Aghion and Tirole 1994; Lerner and Merges 1998). 
For example, Immulogic, a new entrant in the biopharmaceutical industry faced a choice 
of entering into an alliance or raising equity through an initial public offering. A factor 
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that influenced Immulogic’s decision to raise equity from the public market was the fear 
that the pharmaceutical partner might press for concessions on key governance and 
financial issues. Consequently, Immulogic deferred negotiating an alliance until it went 
public in May 1991 (Lerner 1992). Such evidence suggests that the allocation of control 
rights from a NPA is closely linked to the smaller firm’s financial conditions. Therefore, 
improvements in the partner’s financial position often results in protracted re-
negotiations requiring the focal firm to cede important control rights relating to the NPD. 
Incumbents in such situations would be inclined to terminate the NPA because of lower 
residual claims from the innovation effort. Combining these two theoretical predictions, 
I expect a U-shaped relationship between partner valuation and termination. Therefore:                               
H11: The hazard of NPA termination will exhibit a U-shaped relationship with 
changes in the valuation of the smaller alliance partner. It will be lowest for 
moderate levels of valuation of the smaller alliance partner.   
 
DATA 
The empirical setting for testing the research hypotheses is the pharmaceutical industry. 
The data to test the hypotheses was collected from multiple data sources. The data for 
new product alliances between pharmaceutical firms and biotechnology firms were 
collected from the Recap database.9  Although, the Recap database tracks R&D alliances 
of pharmaceutical firms from 1988, fine-grained information on R&D agreements are 
available only from 1990. Consequently, the starting date for the sample was 1990. The 
database was searched for agreements that involved collaboration, research and 
                                                          
9 Recap is a consulting firm based in San Francisco, California that specializes in tracking R&D alliances, 
licensing arrangements, product sales and capitalization information in the biotechnology industry. The 
data in this database has been collected by examining SEC and state filings, news reports, industry reports, 
press releases and scientific meetings.  
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development and co-development between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. 
Licensing agreements, partnerships involving biotech-biotech, biotech-university and 
pharmaceuticals-university were excluded from the sample because these arrangements 
do not have commercialization objectives. In addition, this database also tracks the deal 
size, therapeutic category targeted, technologies employed, the development stage of the 
product at the time of signing and the amount of equity purchased. This information is 
utilized to construct measures of product category focus, technological focus, NPD stage 
and NPA equity respectively. The dates on new product alliance terminations were 
retrieved from Recap’s alliances database, which tracks the progress of early stage NPAs 
and clinical trials database, which tracks the progress of late stage NPAs. However, in a 
few instances, the termination dates were not available in the Recap database. In such 
situations, the archives of Lexis-Nexis and biotechnology firm’s 10k statements were 
searched to retrieve the date of NPA termination. Table 10 provides a summary of 
selected NPA terminations included in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 63
TABLE 10 
 SUMMARY OF NEW PRODUCT ALLIANCE TERMINATIONS 
 
Pharmaceutical 
Firm 
Target 
Therapeutic 
Category 
 
Biotechnology 
Firm 
Termination Summary 
 
Pfizer Inc  
 
Cancer 
 
Megabios Corp. 
 
Megabios Corp. announced today that 
Pfizer has made the decision to 
discontinue their research program 
focused on the development of products 
for oncology that inhibit new blood 
vessel formation (angiogenesis).  
 
Janssen (Johnson & 
Johnson) 
Cancer NeoRX NeoRx Corp. announced that Janssen 
Pharmaceutica N.V. will terminate its 
Avicidin(R) agreement with NeoRx. 
Janssen is currently completing Phase II 
trials in patients with advanced colon 
and prostate cancers.  
 
Johnson & Johnson Blood & 
Hematopoietic 
Alkermes Alkermes, Inc announced that the R.W. 
Johnson Pharmaceutical Research 
Institute (PRI), a Johnson & Johnson 
company, has terminated further 
development of an injectable sustained 
release formulation of erythropoietin 
based on Alkermes' ProLease® drug 
delivery technology.  
 
Schering-Plough Central Nervous 
System 
Cephalon Cephalon, Inc announced today that 
Schering-Plough Corporation will 
discontinue its funding of the 
companies' research collaboration to 
develop compounds for the treatment of 
Alzheimer's disease. 
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Data on the pharmaceutical firm’s product portfolio age was collected from the list of 
approved drugs by Inteleos and Food & Drug Administration.10 These two data sources 
collectively provided approval dates of all of the drugs for the pharmaceutical firms in 
the sample. Another unique feature of the Recap database is the biotechnology valuation 
database that tracks the round-by-round venture capital and equity financing received by 
biotechnology firms at various points in time. This information was used to construct 
partner valuation measures. The data collection methodology resulted in a total of 112 
terminations out of 401 NPAs involving 24 publicly traded pharmaceutical firms and 
241 biotechnology firms between 1990 and 2005. Since the 112 terminations correspond 
to the 401 NPAs formed between 1990 and 2005, the data is not left-censored. Tables 11 
and 12 highlight the frequency distribution of NPA terminations by year and firm 
respectively. The frequency of terminations appears to steadily increase from 1997 to 
2004. In addition, there appears to be considerable differences in the percentage of NPAs 
terminated by firms. While GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer and Elan appear to have a greater 
tendency to terminate NPAs, firms such as Wyeth, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Aventis 
appear to have a tendency to procrastinate the termination decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Inteleos is a database maintained by Elsevier that tracks over 8000 drugs and 1200 pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies 
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TABLE 11 
 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF NPA TERMINATIONS BY YEAR 
 
Year Number of NPA Terminations 
 
1993 1 
1994 3 
1995 2 
1996 2 
1997 13 
1998 14 
1999 9 
2000 5 
2001 12 
2002 19 
2003 15 
2004 10 
2005 6 
2006 1 
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TABLE 12 
 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF NPA TERMINATIONS BY FIRM 
 
Firm Number of NPAs 
 
Number of NPA 
Terminations 
Mallinckrodt 4 0 
Wyeth 21 4 
Bayer 7 2 
Pharmacia 15 6 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 20 4 
Abbott 16 5 
Pfizer 41 18 
Johnson & Johnson 24 7 
Merck 27 3 
Warner-Lambert 8 0 
Schering 36 10 
Baxter 7 2 
Elan 18 8 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 4 1 
Kirin-Amgen 5 0 
Eli Lilly 27 9 
Novo Nordisk 6 2 
GlaxoSmithkline 36 15 
Organon 5 0 
Allergan 8 2 
Aventis 26 4 
Astra 10 2 
Hoechst Marion Roussel 5 4 
Novartis 24 4 
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MEASURES AND METHODOLOGY 
Table 13 provides an overview of the measures and their operationalizations. 
 
TABLE 13 
 VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND DATA SOURCES: STUDY TWO 
 
Variable Operational Measure Data Source(s) 
 
NPA termination 1= Terminated 
0= Right censored 
Recap Alliance Database, Recap 
Clinical Trials Database,  
Lexis Nexis 
 
Product category focus Ratio of the investments in a product 
market to investments in all product 
markets 
 
Recap Alliance Database 
Product portfolio age Average age of the firm’s products in 
the market at the time of the 
termination  
 
Inteleos, FDA 
Product market rivalry Number of new product alliances 
entered by other firms in the 
therapeutic category between NPA 
formation and termination 
 
Recap Alliance Database 
Partner value Finances received by the biotechnology 
firm ($M) between NPA formation and 
termination from external investors 
 
Recap valuation database 
Partner alliances Number of NPAs of the biotechnology 
firm until NPA formation 
 
Recap Alliance database 
 
NPD Scope Size of the deal in $M Recap 
 
NPD Stage Ordinal measure Recap 
Category fixed effects  Dummy variable  Recap 
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the hazard of NPA termination. As noted before, 
NPAs can be terminated for a variety of reasons such as when one of the partners pulls 
out of the venture or when both parties mutually agree to end the NPA. We classify NPA 
terminations in which the incumbent stops further investments as ‘unilateral 
terminations’ and NPA terminations which end because of successful achievement of 
objectives or product failures (i.e., poor end-points) as ‘mutually agreed terminations’. 
This approach of classifying terminations is in line with previous research (Reuer and 
Zollo 2006). Such a competing risks framework allows one to isolate the phenomenon of 
interest (i.e., incumbent initiated terminations) and test whether different types of NPA 
terminations are governed by different stochastic processes.   
 
Independent Variables 
Product category focus is a ratio measure of the firm’s focus on the focal therapeutic 
category to all other therapeutic categories at the time of the NPA termination. Rather 
than using a ratio of the count of NPAs in the focal category to the total count of NPAs 
in all therapeutic categories, this measure was weighted by the investments made in each 
category. This is important because although a firm may have a large number of 
alliances in a given category, if the investments are small, the count ratio may not be an 
appropriate indicator of the firm’s category focus.11 For instance, Wyeth investing $6m 
in respiratory disorders (i.e., one R&D agreement), $400m in central nervous system 
                                                          
11 The therapeutic categories used by Recap is in line with the classification by FDA and is similar to the 
categorization employed  in prior research (see Pisano 1990)   
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(i.e., six R&D agreements), $110m in cardiovascular (i.e., two R&D agreements) and 
over $500m in infection (i.e., four R&D agreements) is indicative of different research 
priorities. Therefore, product category focus measure was constructed as the ratio of the 
investments made in the focal therapeutic category l by firm j up to time t to the total 
investments made in all therapeutic categories by firm j up to time t. Product category 
focus is given by: 
∑
=
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Technological focus. The operationalization of technological focus builds on prior 
research (see Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996; Wuyts, Dutta, and Stremersch 
2004) and is analogous to the Herfindahl index used for industry concentration. The 
technological focus of the incumbent j at the time of termination t is given by 
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,  represents the ratio of the occurrence 
of a technology m in a firm j’s NPA portfolio to the occurrence of all technologies in 
firm j’s portfolio. 
This measure is scaled between 0 and 1, with 0 representing low technological focus and 
1 representing high technological focus. For example, a firm with a portfolio of four 
R&D agreements comprised of technologies such as monoclonals, peptides, rational 
drug design and oligonucleotides respectively has a technology focus of 0.25 whereas a 
firm with a portfolio of four R&D agreements comprised of technologies of peptides, 
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peptides, oligonucleotides and oligonucleotides respectively has a technology focus 
score of  0.5.   
Product portfolio age. This measure was constructed as the average time (in years), 
between the date of approval of all drugs in the pharmaceutical firm’s portfolio and NPA 
termination. Higher values of product portfolio age imply a mature product pipeline, 
whereas lower values of product portfolio age imply a young product pipeline.   
Product market rivalry. Product market rivalry was operationalized as a count measure 
of the total number of new product alliances entered by all other pharmaceutical firms in 
the focal therapeutic category between NPA formation and termination. This 
operationalization is in line with prior research (Pisano 1990). New product alliances 
amongst biotechnology firms were not included in the measure of rivalry because a large 
percentage of them still lack the capabilities to commercialize products on their own.12  
Partner value. Partner value was operationalized as the total finances received (in $m) 
by the biotechnology firm as venture capital and equity between the time of the NPA 
formation and NPA termination.13  The measure does not include finances received from 
NPAs with pharmaceutical firms. To test the U-shaped effects, a spline variable centered 
at the mean of the partner valuation variable was constructed.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Genentech is the only biotechnology company that has commercialized a product on its own. However, 
the firm relies on marketing agreements to market the product all over the world (Pisano 1990).   
13 The dollar amounts calculated in the Recap database are based on shares issued through cumulative 
financing and do not include options or warrant shares. 
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Other Variables 
NPA scope. The scope of the new product alliance was operationalized as the size of the 
deal (in $m). This measure reflects the total resources (i.e., equity purchase, upfront 
payments) invested by the incumbent in the project at the time of formation.   
NPD stage. The stage at which the NPA was signed was operationalized as an ordinal 
measure ranging from 1 to 6. Specifically, discovery alliances were coded as 1, lead 
molecule stage as 2, formulation as 3, phase I as 4, phase II as 5 and phase III clinical 
stage alliances were coded as 6.  
NPA equity. A dummy variable operationalization was used to code whether the NPA 
involved equity. NPAs involving equity were coded as 1 and non-equity NPAs were 
coded as 0. 
Category specific effects.  It could be argued that different product categories have 
inherently different hazards of termination. In order to account for this category specific 
unobserved heterogeneity, a dummy variable operationalization was used.  
 
Model Development 
Consistent with the models used for firm failures (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980; Shane 
2001), I test the hypotheses using a Cox proportional hazard model. The rate at which 
new product alliances are terminated is modeled as a function of the baseline hazard and 
independent variables. The baseline hazard represents the probability of termination 
when the covariates are zero. The covariates modify the probability of the baseline 
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hazard in a multiplicative manner. If  is the time from the date of NPA formation to 
NPA termination, the NPA survivor function can be written as 
iT
)Pr()( tTtS i ≥=         (4) 
The hazard of termination for NPA i with event time at time t can be written as: iT
t
xtTttTt
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Where is the baseline hazard function, is the vector of independent 
variables/covariates for NPA i.  
)(tho ix
Since there are multiple NPAs from the same firm, there could be dependencies between 
termination times across observations. To account for the effect of unobserved firm 
covariates that might impact the baseline hazard, I add shared frailty effects to the model 
specification in (3). In line with prior research (Gupta 1991; Debruyne and Reibstein 
2004), the frailty effects are specified as a gamma distribution as this specification has 
been shown to have a closed form solution.  The hazard of NPA termination for NPA i 
involving incumbent j and new entrant k conditional on a shared frailty effect jυ can be 
written as  
)exp()(),( βυυ ijkojjijk xthXth =  (7)  
Where the sυ are independent and identically distributed gamma variates with density 
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Where θ  represents the heterogeneity amongst firms, with higher values of θ  
representing greater heterogeneity amongst sub-groups of firms and θ =0 implies no 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
In addition, we need to account for the endogeneity of partner value because the 
financing received by the partner could be attributed to the focal NPA. The quality of 
entrepreneurial firms is not directly observable as very few of them have successfully 
developed new products. Therefore, investors draw inferences about the entrepreneurial 
firm’s quality based on their innovativeness and the number of NPAs with incumbents 
(Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough 2005). Accordingly, I formulate a two-stage 
model. Since partner value is bounded by zero, in the first stage, we estimate a Tobit 
regression equation that posits partner value as a linear function of the number of R&D 
alliances of entrepreneurial firms with incumbents and partner innovativeness until the 
time of NPA formation. Since the number of alliances of the partner (i.e., entrepreneurial 
firm) and innovativeness are measured at the time of NPA formation, these instruments 
are not correlated with the error of the termination equation. In the second stage, I 
include the fitted values of partner value from equation (6) as a regressor in equation (4) 
to account for the endogeneity of partner value. 
 
ktijkXtkPINNOVtkNPDALLktPVALUE εαααα +−+−+−+= )(183)1(2)1(10     (9)  
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where NPDALL=  number of alliances of the new entrant with incumbents at formation, 
PINNOV= number of patent citations received by the new entrant at formation. 
In addition, there are ties in the NPA duration times in the data. This is because in some 
cases, we know the month of the termination but not the exact date. I use the Efron 
approximation (Efron 1977) to resolve for the unknown order of duration times.14 The 
likelihood function incorporating Efron’s approximation can therefore be written as 
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Where k is the number of distinct NPA duration times, is the size of the set of 
firms 
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RESULTS 
Table 14 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables in the study. The average 
deal size in our sample is $68.31m which suggests that the partnerships in the sample 
were substantively significant from the standpoint of the pharmaceutical firm. In 
addition, Table 14 suggests that the mean for NPD Stage is 2.63. In addition, a frequency 
count of early stage and late stage NPAs in the sample suggests that approximately 80% 
of the alliances in the sample are early stage alliances (i.e., pre-clinical trials). Also, 50% 
                                                          
14 The literature on proportional hazard models advocates the use of three techniques to handle ties in the 
duration, namely Breslow’s approximation, Efron’s approximation and the exact method. The exact 
method is capable of handling a large number of ties and produces accurate estimates and p-values. In 
situations where the number of ties is moderate as in this study, the estimates and inferential statistics from 
Efron’s approximation are reasonable (Allison 1984; Farewell and Prentice 1980). 
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of the NPAs in the sample are equity-based partnerships. The variance inflation factors 
and the condition indices for the independent variables are within acceptable levels (i.e., 
highest VIF is 2.56, highest condition index is 6.56) thus alleviating concerns of 
multicollinearity.  
Since the focus of this study is on the determinants of NPA termination and not on 
whether the hazard of NPA termination increases or decreases over time, we employ the 
semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard specification. In addition, using a flexible 
baseline hazard allows estimation without making any distributional assumptions on the 
shape of the baseline hazard. Nevertheless, I plotted the baseline hazard over time. 
Figure 7 suggests that the baseline hazard is non-monotonic that peaks at approximately 
4000 days after formation. This is in line with the fact that several drugs typically enter 
the clinical phases approximately 10-12 years after discovery. A key assumption of the 
Cox proportional hazard model is that effect of a covariate is the same at all points in 
time. Table 15 suggests that the test for proportional hazards using scaled Schoenfeld’s 
residuals was not violated for any of the covariates. 
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TABLE 14 
 SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX: STUDY TWO 
 
 Mean Std.Dev PF TF PPAGE PMRIV PVAL SCOPE EQUITY STAGE TC1 TC2 TC3 TC4 TC5 TC6 TC7 TC8 TC9 TC10 
 
PF 
 
0.31 
 
0.28 
 
1 
                 
TF 0.28 0.22 -0.2 1                 
PPAGE 4.97 1.77 0.40 -0.50 1                
PMRIV 1.32 1.21 0.06 -0.19 0.24 1               
PVAL 20.90 53.93 0.25 -0.14 0.23 0.21 1              
SCOPE 0.68 1.25 0.42 -0.18 0.30 -0.047 0.30 1             
EQUITY 0.50 0.50 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.11 1            
STAGE 2.63 1.67 0.15 -0.007 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.19 0.05 1           
TC1 0.16 0.37 -
0.13 
0.04 -0.02 
-0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 
1
1
1
          
TC2 0.02 0.16 -
0.06 
-0.02 0.02 
-0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 
         
TC3 0.13 0.33 -
0.07 
0.01 0.00 
0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.06 
        
TC4 0.02 0.15 -
0.05 
0.00 -0.08 
-0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 
1       
TC5 0.13 0.33 -
0.01 
-0.06 0.03 
-0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.17 -0.06 -0.15 -0.06 
1      
TC6 0.06 0.25 -
0.01 
0.04 0.04 
0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 
1     
TC7 0.19 0.39 0.14 -0.04 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.05 -0.21 -0.07 -0.18 -0.07 -0.19 -0.13 1    
TC8 0.05 0.23 -
0.03 
-0.00 -0.00 
-0.14 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.12 
1   
TC9 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.13 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.12 -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.08 -0.13 -0.07 1  
TC10 0.09 0.28 0.13 -0.04 0.02 -0.20 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.03 -0.13 -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.14 -0.07 -0.08 1 
 
 
 
PF= Product category focus, TF= Technology focus, PPAGE= Product portfolio age, PMRIV= Product market rivalry, 
PVAL= Partner value, SCOPE= New product alliance scope, EQUITY= Equity of the incumbent in the new product alliance, 
STAGE= New product alliance stage, TC1-TC10= Therapeutic categories of the new product alliance 
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FIGURE 7 
SHAPE OF THE BASELINE HAZARD OVER TIME 
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TABLE 15 
TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY HAZARD ASSUMPTION 
 
Covariates χ2  (d.f.) Prob> χ2 
PCFOCUS 0.19(1) 0.66 
TECHFOCUS 0.58(1) 0.44 
PCFOCUS x TECHFOCUS 0.24(1) 0.62 
PRODPORTAGE 0.37(1) 0.54 
PRODPORTAGE x 
TECHFOCUS 
0.47(1) 0.49 
PRODMKTRIVALRY 2.35(1) 0.13 
PRODMKTRIVALRY x 
TECHFOCUS 
1.41(1) 0.23 
PRODMKTFIXEDEFFECTS 7.73(9) 0.56 
PVALUE (LOW) 0.33(1) 0.56 
PVALUE(HIGH) 3.44(1)  0.06* 
NPA SCOPE 1.10(1) 0.28 
NPA EQUITY 1.05(1) 0.30 
NPD STAGE 0.31(1) 0.57 
Global Test 19.57(21) 0.54 
p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Table 16 shows the results of the first stage Tobit regression. The instruments, partner 
innovativeness (PINNOV) and number of R&D alliances with incumbents 
(NUMNPDALL) are positive and statistically significant (p<0.01). In Table 17, Model 1 
is the base model that adds the transactional covariates and control variables to the 
baseline hazard. Model 2 adds firm’s portfolio specific covariates (i.e., product category 
focus, technology focus and product portfolio age) to Model 1. Model 3, the full model 
adds market specific covariates to Model 2. The nested model comparisons using 
likelihood ratio tests suggest that NPA terminations are influenced the most by product 
market and partner characteristics followed by firm’s portfolio characteristics and the 
least by the initial alliance characteristics. Models 4 & 5 test the effects of the firm’s 
portfolio characteristics, product-market characteristics and control variables on 
‘unilateral terminations’ and ‘mutually agreed terminations’ respectively. Since our 
objective is to understand the determinants of an incumbent’s decision to terminate 
NPAs, we use Model 4’s estimates in discussing the results.  Finally, the frailty 
parameter (θ) is statistically significant (p<0.05) in all three models thus suggesting that 
there is a need to control for unobserved firm effects.  
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TABLE 16 
 TOBIT REGRESSION ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR PARTNER VALUE 
 
Variable Parameter Estimates 
 
NUMNPDALLIANCES  0.98(0.17)*** 
PINNOVATIVENESS 5.12(0.89)*** 
Firm Portfolio Characteristics  
ProdCatFocus -12.69(12.68) 
TechFocus 13.36(16.98) 
ProdPortAge 0.28(0.14)** 
Product-market Characteristics  
ProdMktRivalry 0.06(0.02)** 
Product-market Fixed Effects (Control) 0 out of 9 fixed effects significant 
Alliance Characteristics  
NPA Scope 0.10(0.02)*** 
NPA Equity 5.95(5.36) 
NPD Stage -3.06(1.57)* 
Log-likelihood  -1688.92 
Number of observations 354 
p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. The figures in parentheses are the standard error of the parameter estimates. 
The dependent variable is partner value in hundreds of $M. 
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TABLE 17 
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL WITH COMPETING RISKS 
 
 
 
 Model 1  
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
(Unilateral 
Terminations) 
Model 5 
(Mutual 
Terminations) 
 
Firm Portfolio Characteristics 
     
ProdCatFocus   -0.65 (0.20)**    -0.67(0.19)**   -0.78(0.22)** -2.10(1.4) 
TechFocus    1.19 (0.51)**       1.02(0.38)***      0.49(0.12)***       8.50(4.1)** 
ProdCatFocus x TechFocus  1.32(1.51) 1.50(1.70) 0.20(0.14)   4.65(3.68) 
ProdPortAge    -0.02(0.00)***     -0.17(0.08 )**    -0.10(0.03)**  -0.31(0.21) 
ProdPortAge x TechFocus  0.28(0.19) 0.52(0.36)       0.20(0.06)*** 1.04(0.6) 
 
Product-market Characteristics 
     
ProdMktRivalry        -1.42(0.24)***     -1.60(0.39)***     -1.32(0.36)*** 
ProdMktRivalry x TechFocus   -0.17(0.86)    -1.14(0.41)** 1.41(1.07) 
ProdMkt Fixed Effects (Control) 3 out of 9 
significant 
3 out of 9 
significant 
3 out of 9 significant 3 out of 9  
significant 
2 out of 9 
significant 
Partner Characteristics 
Partner Value (Low) 
   
      -0.00(0.00)*** 
 
    -0.53(0.10)*** 
 
-0.01(0.01) 
Partner Value (High)     0.01(0.00)**       1.12(0.31)*** 0.02(0.02) 
 
Alliance Characteristics 
NPA Scope 
NPA Equity 
NPD Stage 
 
 
-0.11(0.10 ) 
0.13(0.20) 
  0.26(0.06)***    
 
 
-0.11(0.11 ) 
0.11(0.21) 
      0.25(0.06)***   
 
 
-0.12(0.13 ) 
0.16(0.22) 
    0.17(0.06)***      
 
 
-0.31(0.29) 
-0.16(0.29) 
     0.22(0.08)***    
 
 
 
0.00(0.15) 
  0.77(0.38)* 
  0.17(0.10)* 
Frailty parameter (θ)    0.16(0.07)**   0.18(0.08)**    0.24(0.07)** 0.41(0.08)***  0.13(0.11) 
 
Log-likelihood (LL) 
 
-530.98 
 
-501.71 
 
-413.28 
 
-274.37 
 
-178.37 
Number of observations 
Number of terminations 
401 
112 
401 
112 
401 
112 
401 
66 
401 
46 
 p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. The figures in parentheses are the standard error of the parameter estimates. 
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H7 states that the hazard of NPA termination is lower for alliances with a greater overlap 
with firm’s NPA portfolio. The results from Table 16 suggest that the parameter estimate 
for product category focus is negative and statistically significant (β1=-0.78, p<0.05). H7 
is thus supported. The parameter estimate can be interpreted as follows. A one unit 
change in product category focus lowers the hazard of NPA termination by 55% (1-e-
0.43). Since, product category focus is scaled between 0 and 1, this implies that the hazard 
of termination for firms with high product category focus (PRODCATFOCUS~ 1) is 
55% lower than for firms with low product category focus (PRODCATFOCUS ~ 0). H8 
states that the hazard of NPA termination is higher for alliances with a greater overlap 
with the firm’s NPA portfolio. The parameter estimate for technology focus is positive 
and statistically significant (β2=0.49, p<0.01) thus supporting H8. Substantively, the 
hazard of termination for firms with high technology focus (TECHFOCUS ~ 1) is 63% 
higher than for firms with low technology focus (TECHFOCUS~0). Given the 
differential impact of product category focus and technology focus on the hazard of 
termination, we tested for two-way interaction between product category focus and 
technology focus. The interaction term was statistically insignificant (p>0.10). H9 states 
that the hazard of NPA termination is lower for firms with aging product portfolios. The 
parameter estimate of product portfolio age is negative and statistically significant 
(β4=0.10, p<0.05). Thus H9 is supported. This implies that as the product pipeline of the 
firm ages by a year, the hazard of termination decreases by 9.5% (1- e-0.10)]. However, 
the interaction of technology focus and product portfolio age is positive and statistically 
significant (β5= 0.20, p<0.01). This suggests that regardless of the age of the product 
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pipeline, the technological focus of the firm’s NPA portfolio tends to increase the hazard 
of termination. H10 states that the hazard of NPA termination in product markets 
characterized by intense rivalry is lower. The parameter estimate of product market 
rivalry is negative and statistically significant (β6=-1.60, p<0.01). Thus H10 is supported. 
In addition, I find that the interaction of product market rivalry and technology focus is 
negative and statistically significant (β6= -1.14). This suggests that the impact of 
technological focus of the firm’s NPA portfolio on the hazard of termination is 
negatively moderated by extent of rivalry in product markets. H11 states that the hazard 
of NPA termination is lowest at moderate levels of partner value. The parameter 
estimate for low levels of partner value is negative and statistically significant (β9= -
0.53, p<0.01) whereas the parameter estimate for high levels of partner value is positive 
and statistically significant (β10= 1.12, p<0.01) thus lending support for H11.  
In addition, the results suggest that the initial alliance characteristics have relatively 
little influence in predicting NPA terminations. The estimates for NPA scope and NPA 
equity is statistically insignificant (p>0.10). However, the estimate for NPD stage is 
positive and statistically significant (β9=0.22, p<0.01). Therefore, late stage NPAs have a 
higher hazard of termination compared to early stage NPAs. Substantively, a unit change 
in stage of the NPD (e.g., discovery to lead molecule, lead molecule to preclinical stage) 
increases the hazard of termination by approximately 25% (e0.22-1). This is in line with 
the fact that a number of later stage NPAs are abandoned without receiving a marketing 
approval (DiMasi 2000).  
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As regards control variables, the parameter estimates for three out of nine therapeutic 
categories were statistically significant (p< 0.05). NPAs in the categories of central 
nervous system, cardiovascular and cancer have higher hazard of termination (i.e, 
relative to respiratory disorders). Table 18 provides a summary of the results. 
 
 
TABLE 18 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS:STUDY TWO 
 
Variable Prediction Result Rationale 
Product category focus (H7) (-) Supported Firms with NPA portfolios focused 
on fewer categories have lower 
hazards of termination because of 
knowledge spillovers across 
projects within the category 
Technology focus (H8) (+) Supported Firms with NPA portfolios focused 
on fewer technologies have higher 
hazard of termination because 
technology represents an 
exogenous source of uncertainty 
Product portfolio age (H9) (-) Supported Firms with mature product 
pipelines have lower hazard of 
termination in order to avoid the 
losses that might accrue from co-
specialized downstream assets (i.e., 
sales and manufacturing) 
Product market rivalry (H10) (-) Supported Firms with alliances in product 
markets characterized by intense 
rivalry have lower hazard of 
termination because of lack of 
availability of partners in the 
product market  
Partner value (H11) -/+ Supported Partner value has a U-shaped 
impact on the hazard of 
termination. At low levels of 
partner value the hazard of 
termination is high because of the 
lack of external validation of the 
partner’s NPD program. At high 
levels of partner value, the hazard 
of termination is high because 
greater control rights from the 
innovation may need to be 
allocated to the partner as a result 
of its improved financial health. 
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Robustness Checks 
I performed several checks to ensure the robustness of the results. First, although the 
substantive interest is not in studying the shape of the hazard over time, I estimated a 
few alternate hazard models where a functional form was specified for the baseline 
hazard. Specifically, I estimated models with log-logistic and log-normal baseline 
hazards. The effects of the covariates were substantively identical across these alternate 
specifications. The coefficients of these alternate specifications and the Cox proportional 
hazard model have opposite signs. This is expected as Cox proportional models focus on 
the hazard rate whereas log-normal and log-logistic models use the accelerated failure 
time metric. Second, I estimated a split population duration model that accounts for both 
the timing and the incidence of terminations. The split population model was specified 
using a log-logistic hazard for the timing of terminations and a logit model for the 
incidence of terminations.  Identical covariates were used for both the timing and the 
incidence models. The choice of a parametric duration model was dictated by the fact 
that split population models with unspecified baseline hazard (e.g., Cox proportional 
hazard model) are virtually non-existent. The results from Table 19 suggest that the 
splitting parameter (δ) (estimated mean probability of termination) was 0.97. Therefore, 
the assumption of a homogenous population in which all of the observations will 
experience terminations appears reasonable in this empirical context. This is in line with 
industry evidence that a very high percentage of NPAs between pharmaceutical firms 
and biotechnology firms tend to be terminated (DiMasi 2000).  
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TABLE 19 
 SPLIT POPULATION DURATION MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
 Timing  
(Log-logistic hazard model) 
Incidence 
 (Logit model) 
 
Firm Portfolio Characteristics 
  
ProdCatFocus 0.16 (0.03)*** 12.74 (6.50)** 
TechFocus -0.34 (0.16)** 5.76 (3.80) 
ProdCatFocus x TechFocus -0.22 (0.15) 7.8 (11.31) 
ProdPortAge 0.06 (0.03)**  0.00 (0.00)* 
ProdPortAge x TechFocus -0.19(0.09)** 1.58 (0.93) 
 
Product-market Characteristics 
  
ProdMktRivalry 0.72 (0.08)*** 2.16 (1.94) 
ProdMktRivalry x TechFocus 0.51(0.23)** 3.87(3.10) 
ProdMkt Fixed Effects (Control) 2 of 9 significant 0 of 9 significant 
Partner Characteristics 
Partner Value (Low) 
 
0.45 (0.12)*** 
 
 0.12 (0.14) 
Partner Value (High) -0.89 (0.45)** -0.19 (0.12) 
 
Alliance Characteristics 
 
  
NPA Scope -0.02 (0.12) -10.08 (5.51)* 
NPA Equity 0.00 (0.00) 0.14 (0.10) 
NPD Stage 0.02 (0.03) 7.12 (4.25)** 
 
Log-likelihood (LL)                                                  -545.80 
Shape Parameter                                                                 0.30 (0.03)*** 
Mean Probability of Termination (δ)                           0.97 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. The figures in parentheses are the standard error of the parameter estimates 
 
 
Third, it can be argued that the determinants for NPA terminations are likely to be 
different across different stages of the NPA. To test this possibility, I did a sub-group 
analysis by dividing the sample into early stage NPAs (i.e., discovery, lead molecule and 
formulation) and late stage NPAs (i.e., phase I, phase II, phase III). The proportion of 
early stage NPAs in our sample is approximately 80% whereas the remainder (i.e., 20%)  
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are late stage alliances. I re-estimated the model on these sub-samples. Most of the 
results were substantively similar across these two groups. The only exception was that 
product category focus had a statistically insignificant impact (p>0.10) on the hazard of 
termination for late stage alliances. This suggests that the benefits of knowledge 
spillovers or scope economies in late stage NPAs (i.e., management of clinical trials) 
perhaps accrue both within and across product categories. 
 
THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Implications for Research 
The findings of this study have important implications for research. Firstly, I show that 
the decision to terminate NPAs are not made in isolation but are influenced by the 
structure of the firm’s portfolio. Previous researchers have characterized investments in 
NPAs as uncorrelated choices (Kogut 1991; Park and Russo 1996).  However, I find that 
investments in NPAs share positive and negative interdependencies with each other. 
Furthermore, we find that terminations are poorly predicted by the initial characteristics 
of the NPA. Firms that focus on NPAs in a fewer product categories have lower hazards 
of NPA termination. This implies that firms choose to deepen their capabilities in 
product markets rather than broadening their research scope in order to exploit the 
knowledge spillovers within the same product category, This is line with prior research 
that notes that a focused research program (i.e., higher Herfindahl index) increases the 
overall productivity of the firm’s R&D efforts (i.e., important patents received) 
(Cockburn and Henderson 1996). However, I do not find any positive externalities for 
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the technology platforms employed across NPAs in the portfolio. This implies that 
because technology is an exogenous source of uncertainty, firms explore a number of 
different technological paths in their search for innovative new products. Recent 
research examining the internal R&D performance of incumbents and new entrants, 
notes that incumbents experience ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ streaks in R&D output over time and 
that such inconsistencies impact the termination heuristic adopted (Gino and Pisano 
2006; Chan, Nickerson, and Owan 2007). I test this argument in the context of an 
incumbent’s new product partnerships and find that the hazard of NPA termination is 
indeed lower for firms with mature product portfolios. According to recent research, it 
has been argued that firms that have a high ‘desperation index’ because of imminent 
patent expirations tend to make poor acquisition choices and experience negative stock 
market returns (Higgins and Rodriguez 2006). Along similar lines, it can be speculated 
that with an aging product portfolio firms might advance even marginally economical 
NPAs to the next stage.  
The findings suggest that NPA terminations are influenced to a greater extent by 
changes in the firm’s product market and partner environment than by changes in the 
firm’s alliance portfolio and product portfolio. Recently, researchers have argued that 
increased product-market rivalry increases the hazard of termination because the threat 
of preemption by competition diminishes the value of the underlying growth opportunity 
(Folta and Miller 2002). In contrast, I find that firms tend to hold on to NPAs in crowded 
product-markets. I attribute this effect to the lack of potential partners in the product 
market who could otherwise continue the research and development efforts for the NPA. 
 
 88
It is also plausible that there are ‘social contagion effects’ in product markets akin to 
what has been reported in the innovation literature (Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001; 
Debruyne and Reibstein 2004), although  I am unable to disentangle these effects with 
the data.  
Finally, I find that partner value has a U-shaped impact on NPA termination. There 
is a large stream of research that argues that changes in financing availability impacts 
organizational structure and outcomes (Aghion and Tirole 1994; Lerner, Shane, and Tsai 
2003). This paper takes an initial step in linking the fluctuations in the financing 
environment of partners to termination outcomes. I find that when partners are able to 
raise significant amount of equity from external investors, they renegotiate the terms of 
the contract thereby diminishing the value of the NPA to the incumbent. .  
 
Implications for Practice 
The findings of this study have important implications for managing new product 
alliances. It is well-recognized that firms need to adopt a portfolio mindset in managing 
new product alliances and go beyond individual deals. According to Gomes-Casseres 
(2002), managing new product partnerships goes beyond striking deals and includes 
managing the portfolio over time to see how it’s growing, which alliances tend to be the 
most beneficial and which could be closed and how resources should be allocated. Using 
a portfolio approach to NPAs, this study identifies NPAs that share positive and negative 
interdependencies with other NPAs in the incumbent’s portfolio. Therefore, managers 
attending to the transactional features of the NPA in deciding which NPAs to 
 
 89
continue/discontinue are likely to be making sub-optimal decisions. This is indeed 
echoed in the sentiments of the chief financial officer (CFO) of Merck who observes that 
when managers frequently face the decision of whether to continue to invest in a drug 
development program, options analysis provides the needed flexibility that traditional 
analysis based on net present value (NPV) may not provide (Nichols 1994).  
Are product–markets and technologies employed for innovation sources of 
uncertainty that needs to balanced through diversification? The results are indicative of 
important differences between product markets and technologies. Firms that focus on 
fewer product markets stand to gain because of knowledge spillovers across R&D 
alliances. In contrast, NPAs employing the same technologies are substitutes. These two 
findings imply that firms employing a diverse set of technologies in fewer product 
markets could balance risk and exploit knowledge externalities, although I did not find 
support for this effect. As regards product portfolio effects, I find that the hazard of NPA 
terminations is lower for firms with aging product pipelines. In such situations, firms 
face the danger of advancing marginally economical NPAs to the next stage and 
increasing the overall costs of NPD.   
The results also point to the need for firms to pay close attention to competitor 
activity in the focal product-market as it provides useful insights regarding the 
availability of potential R&D partners in the product market. In addition, firms also need 
to track the financing markets in the industry as it indicates whether partners will 
succeed in raising capital from external investors. This is important as the findings 
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suggest that the partners that can strengthen their financial position after the formation of 
the NPA could potentially destabilize the NPA.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
This study, like any empirical endeavor has certain limitations that future research could 
address. First, although the empirical context of this study is the biopharmaceutical 
industry, findings are generalizable to other high-technology industries where 
investments are characterized by a great deal of uncertainty (e.g., semiconductors, 
information technology). Future research could test the generalizability of the findings in 
alternate empirical contexts. Second, in the absence of performance data on NPAs, the 
findings are descriptive rather than normative. Third, this study does not account for the 
incumbent’s internal R&D efforts in various product markets. Future research could 
explore whether firm’s internal R&D portfolios influence the terminations of NPAs. A 
fourth limitation of the study relates to the unavailability of data on the potential market 
size of the various therapeutic categories. Future research that explicitly account for how 
changes in market size impact the firm’s NPA portfolio management strategy can shed 
additional insights. This would entail getting relevant data on demand-based market size 
measures because market size measure based on drug sales is endogenous (i.e., better 
drugs have higher sales). Examining the relationship between incumbent’s termination 
decisions and its financial performance is an important avenue for future research.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The ubiquity of NPD alliances between “unequals” in high technology industries can be 
attributed to the fact that neither larger firms nor smaller firms are able to muster all of 
the resources needed to develop, manufacture, and market products on their own. In this 
dissertation, I examine two important issues pertaining to the formation and termination 
of asymmetric NPD alliances. Although, such alliances frequently conjure up images of 
‘David versus Goliath’ at first glance, the results from study one show that value is 
created for both the partners. More importantly, I find interesting asymmetries in the 
magnitude and drivers of the changes in the values for the larger and the smaller partner 
firms, offering valuable insights. 
 New product alliances are clearly vital for innovation in high technology 
industries. However, greater number of NPAs in one’s portfolio does not necessarily 
increase the odds of success. The challenge for firms is to balance resources with 
opportunities, identify winners, weed out losers and redeploy resources as priorities 
shift. In study two, I develop and empirically test a framework of the determinants of 
NPA terminations.  The results suggest that NPA terminations evolve with changes in 
the firm’s alliance and product portfolio. I also find that NPA terminations are predicted 
to a great extent by competition in product markets and changes in the alliance partner’s 
financial conditions. The findings of this study hold the potential to spawn a stream of 
research on the dynamics of NPA termination and its financial consequences. 
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APPENDIX 1  
COMPUTATION OF NPV OR SHORT-TERM ABNORMAL RETURNS 
The market model for the event study is given by: 
ktmtkkkt RR εβα ++=         (11) 
where Rkt denotes the daily returns of kth firm in the NPD alliance at time t, measured 
over a 240-day window, kk βα , are firm-specific parameters, Rmt is the daily return on the 
CRSP equally-weighted market index, and ktε is an error term assumed to be distributed 
i.i.d. normal.  Furthermore,  
mtktkkt RR βα ˆˆˆ +=          (12) 
 
The abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR), are thus given by: 
ktktkt RRAR ˆ−=          (13) 
∑
−=
− =
1
1
)1,1(
t
ktkt ARCAR          (14) 
Because stock prices are strongly correlated with firm size, to control for this size effect, 
I compute the net present value accruing to the partner firm as the product of cumulative 
abnormal returns over the event window and the market capitalization of the firm. In line 
with previous research, I computed the market capitalization of the firm as the product of 
the firm’s share price and number of outstanding shares 20 days prior to the alliance 
announcement (Chan et al 1997, p. 210).15  
                                                          
15 In the event that the market was closed for trading 20 days prior to the announcement date, the previous 
trading day was selected to retrieve the share price and the number of outstanding shares of the firm. 
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The NPV of firm k following the NPD alliance announcement at time t is operationalized 
as 
)1,1()20()20( −−−= kttktkkt CARPNSHARESNPV       (15) 
where NSHARESk(t-20) = Number of outstanding shares of firm k 20 days prior to the 
event,  Pk(t-20) = Firm k’s stock price 20 days prior to the event, and the other terms are as 
defined earlier. 
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APPENDIX 2  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
I performed several robustness checks. First, a common criticism of the event study 
methodology is that the results are sensitive to the chosen event windows. To alleviate 
this concern, I calculated the financial gains by using the cumulative abnormal returns 
over different event windows (e.g., -3 to +3, -5 to + 5). The substantive results of the 
analysis remain unchanged across the event windows. 
Second, an emerging body of research in finance and in marketing (e.g., Fama and 
French 1993; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 1999; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007) 
contends that because stock markets are at best semi-efficient, there is a need to examine 
the long-term (typically 12 months after the event) stock performance especially if short-
term gains are insignificant. The results show that short-term financial gains are 
significant for both larger and smaller firms. Nevertheless, consistent with studies of 
long-term returns, I performed calendar-time portfolio regressions to assess the long-
term stock performance (see Appendix 3 for details). The results of this analysis show 
that the long-term abnormal returns accruing to both the larger and smaller firms, 
although significant, are marginal, confirming that the gains are mainly short-term. Thus, 
these results rule out the possibility of long-term performance reversals. 
Third, I checked whether the results are robust to alternative operationalizations of 
firm size. I operationalized firm size in terms of the number of employees and sales 
revenues. These alternative operationalizations did not alter the patterns of asymmetry in 
the NPD alliance. Furthermore, the results for the hypothesized effects did not change 
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substantively regardless of the firm size measures employed. Fourth, additional 
robustness checks for asset size ratios (of larger to smaller firm) greater than 6, 8, and 10 
did not alter the substantive results, although the standard errors were inflated because of 
reduced sample size. 
Fifth, to check if there are spillover or feedback effects of changes in shareholder 
values of the larger and the smaller firm on each other, I estimated a simultaneous 
equation model using two stage least squares (2SLS), three stage least squares (3SLS), 
and generalized method of moments (GMM) methods.  The effect of the change in 
shareholder value of each type of firm on the change in the shareholder value of its 
partner firm did not turn out be significant, so the proposed model was retained. 
Sixth, it can be potentially argued that the smaller firm gains more than the larger 
firm because of anticipation on the part of the investors that the smaller firm might be 
acquired by the bigger firm. To rule out this possibility, I examined the data for 
acquisitions. Only three alliances in the data resulted in an acquisition of the smaller firm 
by the larger firm. I re-estimated the model by excluding these three alliances, but the 
substantive results remained unchanged.   
Finally, I performed additional analyses to check if alliance characteristics result in 
value changes for the combined portfolio of larger and smaller firms. The results suggest 
that alliance type and alliance scope did not have statistically significant effects on the 
combined wealth change of the partner firms (p > 0.10). However, the interaction of 
alliance type and alliance scope had a statistically significant effect on the combined 
 
 109
financial gains (p < 0.05). Thus, these results suggest that scale alliances that are of 
broad scope enhance the combined wealth of the partner firms. 
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APPENDIX 3   
LONG-TERM RETURNS FOR PARTNER FIRMS IN AN ALLIANCE  
The commonly used approach in the event study literature to examine long-run abnormal 
returns is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns method. However, this method is unable to 
control for cross-sectional dependence and often yields inflated test statistics (Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai 1999). A second approach that controls for cross-sectional dependence 
is based on calendar-time portfolios (e.g., Fama and French 1993; Sorescu, Shankar, and 
Kushwaha 2007). In this approach, the sample firms are grouped into portfolios based on 
the event date and the inference is based on a time series of the mean abnormal return of 
the portfolio.  
I used the Fama-French three factor model to compute the one-year long run 
abnormal returns. I used the calendar-time return on a portfolio of firms created on the 
basis of the event date to estimate the following regression: 
ittHMLptSMBpftRmtRppftRptR εδγβα +++−+=− )(   (16) 
where  is the simple returns of the calendar-time portfolio p at time t, is the return 
on three-month treasury bills, is the return on the value-weighted market index, 
 is the difference in the returns of the portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, 
ptR ftR
mtR
SMB
HML  is the difference in the returns of the portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and 
low book-to-market stocks, and ε is the error term.. The intercept is the mean monthly 
abnormal returns on the calendar-time portfolio.  The results for larger and smaller firms 
are shown below. 
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TABLE 20 
LONG-TERM ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR LARGER FIRMS: CALENDAR-
TIME PORTFOLIO REGRESSIONS 
 
Coefficient Average month in (-12, 12) OLS t-statistic 
 
Heteroskedasticity 
consistent t 
αp 
(Abnormal return) 
0.01 2.23* 2.27* 
βp 1.21    13.64***    11.07*** 
δp 0.21 2.52* 1.94+ 
γp - 0.70  - 6.76***   - 6.01*** 
R2 0.79   
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 21 
LONG-TERM ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR SMALLER FIRMS: CALENDAR-
TIME PORTFOLIO REGRESSIONS 
 
Coefficient Average month in (-12, 12) OLS t-statistic Heteroskedasticity 
consistent t 
 αp 
 (Abnormal return) 
0.00 2.21*   2.08* 
βp 1.58     8.70***        8.48*** 
δp 1.14      6.15***       4.80*** 
γp                      - 1.16   - 5.08***      - 4.01*** 
R2 0.71   
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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